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INTRODUCTION
Originalism is usually called a theory of interpretation, a particular way to read a text. Best understood, though, originalism
is much more than that. It’s a theory of our law: a particular
way to understand where our law comes from, what it requires, and how it can be changed.
This view starts with a common assumption of legal systems,
that the law stays the same until it’s lawfully changed. A statute that’s hundreds of years old can still be good law today,
simply because it was properly enacted at some earlier time
and has never been amended or repealed. If you start with an
old statute book and add everything enacted since, you should
end up with the code as it stands today.
To an originalist, what’s true of old statutes is also true of
our old Constitution, and indeed of our old law generally.
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Whatever rules of law we had at the Founding, we still have
today, unless something legally relevant happened to change
them. Our law happens to consist of their law, the Founders’
law, including lawful changes made along the way. Preserving
the meaning of the Founders’ words is important, but it’s not
an end in itself. It’s just a means to preserving the content of
the Founders’ law.
Not everyone agrees with this picture, of course; not even all
“originalists.” People use the word “originalism” in lots of different ways. But treating originalism as a claim about law, not
just interpretation, gets us past some of the debates that have
occupied the field—and it helps us see the way to more fruitful
areas for agreement.
At the moment, most defenses of originalism fall into two
camps, which we can call “normative” and “conceptual.”
Normative defenses portray certain interpretive methods as
good ideas (because they constrain judges, promote democracy, and so on). These defenses might be right or wrong; more
importantly, the good ideas they defend might not be reflected
in our law. Maybe American law, as it currently exists, doesn’t
constrain judges or promote democracy as much as it ought to.
If originalism is just a law reform project, it loses much of its
rhetorical force. Conceptual defenses, by contrast, start from
incontestable legal assumptions (say, that the Constitution is
law). They then argue, on philosophical grounds, that the Constitution’s meaning just is its original meaning (intention, understanding, public meaning, etc.). But the law doesn’t have to
reflect good philosophy any more than good policy. So it might
be that our legal system, like Canada’s or France’s, reads our
constitutional text some other way or incorporates some other
sources of law.
In other words, to know what to make of these defenses, we
need to know whether (and to what extent) originalism is already part of American law. This inquiry points the way toward
what we could call “positive” defenses—claims that originalism,
as a matter of social fact and legal practice, is actually endorsed
by our positive law. In academic circles, positive defenses are
relatively rare; indeed, they’re almost unheard of. One prominent originalist recently argued that “[n]o one, as of yet, has
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made a strong case for concluding the original meaning is the
law”—or has “even tried [to do so] in an extended article.”1
This Article tries to fill that gap. Modern originalism may
have gotten its start by critiquing, not affirming, everyday legal
practice. But these critiques were founded on deeper features
of American constitutional law—which is why they accused
judges and other officials of departing from the law rather than
following it. What matters for our understanding of the law
isn’t just everyday practice, but the premises that are implicit in
our legal arguments, the claims about the structure of our law
that we’re willing publicly to accept and defend. At that level,
there’s a clear originalist strain in our legal thought, one best
captured by viewing originalism as a theory of legal change.
American constitutional law cares about genealogy. One useful
way of getting at the nature of a constitutional challenge is to ask
about the challenged practice, “When do you think it became unconstitutional?”2—with the range of acceptable answers stretching
from the Founding through yesterday. If the law was X at the
Founding but is supposed to be Y today, the natural follow-up
question is what happened in between—and why whatever happened (an amendment, a statute, a shift in custom or usage) was
legally capable of making that change. Almost every legal system
distinguishes authorized changes like these from the unauthorized changes that happen when society simply abandons or departs from some preexisting rule of law. But a distinctive feature
of the American legal system is that it fixes a particular starting
date—an origin, a Founding—separating the changes that don’t
need legal authorization from those that do. Americans don’t
think that we’re living in a Fifth Republic, the way the French do,
but rather in the same Republic we started with.
This intuition is the core of originalism, viewed as a theory of
legal change. What originalism requires of legal change is that it
1. Mike Rappaport, Is Originalism the Law?: The Law Reform Criticism, LIBR. L. &
LIBERTY (May 30, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2014/05/30/is-originalismthe-law-the-law-reform-criticism/ [http://perma.cc/S9VA-B7SH]. For a few steps in
this direction, see Stephen E. Sachs, The “Constitution in Exile” as a Problem for Legal
Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2253 (2014); William Baude, Is Originalism Our
Law?, 116 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 134–49 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Series No. 0724, 2008), http://ssrn.com/id=1120244 [http://perma.cc/9ZAZ-PFVE].
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013) (emphasis added).
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be, well, legal; that it be lawful, that it be done according to law.
This is a requirement of procedure, not substance. It makes
originalism a “big tent,” potentially allowing a wide variety of
legal changes (judicial precedents, liquidation by practice, and so
on) depending on how the law stood at the time. The originalist
claim is that each change in our law since the Founding needs a
justification framed in legal terms, and not just social or political
ones. To put it another way, originalists believe that the American legal system hasn’t yet departed (even a little bit) from the
Founders’ law in the way that the colonies threw off the British
yoke or the states got rid of the Articles of Confederation. If this
sounds implausible to you, then that may be a perfectly good
reason not to be an originalist. But this Article suggests that it
may be more plausible than you think.
This theory also produces a version of originalism that might
be particularly attractive to those who already consider themselves originalists. What’s important about the Constitution of
1788 isn’t what it said, but what it did: the legal rules it added to
the American corpus juris, the contribution (to use Mark Greenberg’s phrase) it made to the preexisting body of law.3 Whatever
the Constitution added to the law, it added at the time of its enactment. To find out the law that the Constitution made, the relevant way to read the document’s text would be according to the
rules of the time, legal and otherwise, for turning enacted text
into law. If that version needs a label, we could call it “originallaw originalism”: the view that the Constitution should be read
according to its original legal content, whatever that might have
been. (Why else look to the text, if not to find the law that it produced? Why be more “originalist” than the Founders, or more
Catholic than the Pope?) Viewed in these terms, debates between originalists and nonoriginalists are really positive debates
about the sources of our current law; disputes among different
schools of originalists are really historical disputes about the
content of the law at the Founding.
Thinking about originalism this way helps redefine the relationship between law and history. If originalism is based on our
rules for legal change, then it isn’t just about recovering the
meaning of ancient texts, a project for philologists and histori3 . Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the
Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE
IN THE LAW 217, 219 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011).
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ans. Instead, it’s about determining the content of our law, today,
in part by recovering Founding-era doctrine. That means learning some history, but it also means exercising legal judgment,
the kind we hire lawyers for. (In the same way, if we want to
learn the law of some foreign country, we ask lawyers with relevant expertise, not just ethnographers or sociologists.) Doing
originalist research requires some specialized techniques, but so
does chasing down an old chain of title. As a theory of legal
change, originalism is just ordinary lawyer’s work.
This Article isn’t intended as a once-and-for-all defense of
originalism, much less this original-law version thereof. Instead, the goal is simply to clear away some theoretical underbrush, sketching out the different positions, and hopefully
pushing scholars toward more productive areas of debate. Both
originalists and nonoriginalists need to show their jurisprudential cards. Is our law really the Founders’ law? If not, how is it
different? When did the two diverge, and do we accept that
divergence all the way down? To be a nonoriginalist, on this
Article’s view, is to say of some new rule: “Maybe Rule X
wasn’t lawfully adopted; maybe it can’t be defended under
preexisting law; but I’m okay with that, and so is America.”
Originalists can say that about the Constitution itself, but not of
anything invented since. What do you say it about, and why do
you think it’s true?
American law might be originalist in nature, but then again it
might not. Which view is right depends on facts about society
today, not two hundred years ago. This Article merely argues
that, if it is true, the claim that we adhere to the Founders’ law
is the best reason to be an originalist—and, if it’s false, the best
reason not to.
I.

ORIGINALISM AND POSITIVE LAW

“Originalism” means lots of things to lots of people.4 To most
people, though, originalism is a theory about how to interpret the
Constitution’s text,5 which they defend in one of two ways. Some
4. See Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary
Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12, 32 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
5. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, On Pluralism Within Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 70, 71.
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originalists rely on broad normative arguments, citing values like
popular sovereignty,6 liberty,7 or public welfare.8 If we can better
serve these values by enforcing the Constitution’s original meaning, as opposed to some other meaning, then we should do so.
Others think originalism follows from conceptual truths about the
right way to read legal documents—or even all written texts in
general. If, for example, written texts always mean whatever their
authors intended them to mean, then the same is true of the Constitution; any other reading is simply mistaken.9
Neither defense, though, is fully persuasive. Each depends
on assumptions that aren’t really about values or meanings,
but about the content of our law. Whatever interpretive method we might prefer as a matter of policy, we still need to know
whether judges and officials can act on that preference, or
whether their legal obligations point the other way. And whatever our philosophical commitments about interpretation, we
still need to know whether (and to what extent) the document
we’re interpreting is legally authoritative.
In other words, we have to deal with the content of the law
anyway. If so, maybe we should make that all we have to deal
with—treating originalism not as a normative or conceptual
matter, but as a legal one.
A.

Normative Defenses of Originalism

One common way to defend originalism is to argue that it
achieves some normative goal. The first modern originalists
6. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 154 (1999); Kurt T. Lash,
Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437,
1444–46 (2007).
7. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89–119 (rev. ed. 2014). Barnett also advances a conceptual
defense of public-meaning originalism, see id. at 391–94, which runs alongside his
theory of legitimacy, see id. at 119.
8. See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE
GOOD CONSTITUTION 2 (2013).
9. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is that English You’re Speaking?”: Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967,
969 (2004); Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 539, 539–40 (2013); Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE
CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 87; Larry Alexander, Telepathic Law,
27 CONST. COMMENT. 139, 139–40 (2010); Paul F. Campos, A Text Is Just A Text, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 327, 327 (1996); Stanley Fish, The Intentionalist Thesis Once
More, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 99, 101.
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often presented their theory as the only way to reconcile judicial review with democracy.10 Some modern originalists do the
same,11 while others focus on popular sovereignty,12 individual
liberty,13 or public welfare generally.14 If they’re right, then to
the extent we value these things, we ought to be originalists,
too. Put much too simply, we could state the normative defense
as follows:
(N1) If something would be a good idea, we should do it.
(N2) Following the Constitution’s original meaning would
be a good idea.
 (N3) We should follow the Constitution’s original meaning.

Many nonoriginalists reject this argument at step two. Maybe
the original meaning isn’t a good idea; maybe it’s actually lousy.15
Or maybe it’s better on some counts and worse on others, which
means we’ll have to decide among various normative goals.
The real problem for originalists, though, is at step one.
There are lots of good ideas in the world, like reforming health
care or fixing the tax code. But the fact that they’re good ideas
doesn’t make them part of the law—or make it another good
idea for judges and officials to go ahead and implement them
on their own. The same goes for originalism. If these normative
arguments are really calls to change the law, that’d undercut
many of the intuitions on which originalists commonly rely.
Originalists don’t usually describe themselves as doing law
reform, or as members of one more interest group trying to implement its agenda through the courts. (If anything, it’s a staple
of originalist rhetoric to condemn “legislating from the
bench.”) Originalism as a policy program, even a really good
one, isn’t what many originalists are looking for.

10. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 4 (1971); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 705 (1976); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57
U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989).
11. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF
ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 223, 232–33.
12. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 6; Lash, supra note 6.
13. See BARNETT, supra note 7.
14. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 8.
15. See generally Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365
(1990) (critiquing originalist arguments).
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Originalism as a Good Idea

Suppose there were a knock-down argument, on your favorite
normative theory, that originalism is the best way of reading the
Constitution’s text. The payoff of an argument like that, of identifying a “best way” of reading the text, is that it might lead you to
particular legal outcomes: whether the President has a removal
power,16 whether there’s an individual right to bear arms,17 and so
on. But in real life, you can’t get there from here. The fact that one
method is normatively better than others doesn’t mean that the
rules produced by that method are actually part of our law.18
As Brian Leiter notes, one thing most legal theorists agree on—
especially those known as “legal positivists”—is that “what the
law is and what the law ought to be are separate questions.”19 If
we want to know what the law is, whether in a foreign country or
the United States, we have to see how that society operates; “what
counts as law in any society is fundamentally a matter of social
fact.”20 Experts disagree about which facts actually matter—which
people in a society have to hold which customs, conventions, beliefs, norms, and so on, for something to be the law.21 (Does law
depend on the practices of officials, the understandings of bench
and bar, the conventions of ordinary people, . . . ?)
If social facts are what matter, though, one thing that likely
doesn’t matter is the goodness of a proposed rule (or method of
discovering the rules)—unless perhaps the social facts say it

16. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
17. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
18. This Article uses “rules” in a very capacious sense, referring to any considerations that might “screen[] off from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take into account.” Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97
YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988). That includes precise commands, flexible standards,
value-based principles, forgiving guidelines, orders, norms, plans, and any other
kind of instructions the law might potentially convey.
19. Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 355,
356 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001).
20. Id. at 356; accord Leslie Green, Introduction to H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW, at xv (3d ed. 2012); Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule
of Recognition: Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 726
(2006).
21. Compare, e.g., HART, supra note 20 (taking one particular view), and SCOTT J.
SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011) (taking another). See generally Adler, supra note 20 (describing the debate).
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should.22 Maybe our law, as an empirical matter, is just less democracy-promoting, liberty-protecting, or welfare-enhancing
than we’d like. Canada and many other countries are said to be
nonoriginalist, after all.23 How do we know we’re not like them?
Originalism usually comes across as a restorative project, one
that rescues the true law from subsequent developments that
have obscured it. That might mean reversing an occasional mistaken precedent, but only to apply the actual law in its place.
This picture assumes that the rules that originalism generates
(about removal powers, rights to bear arms, and so on) are in
some sense already the law—that, despite appearances, there’s
still something here to vindicate. Normative arguments might
show why the issue matters, but the legal case is already won.24
Yet if American law, like Canadian law, really is nonoriginalist, then the normative arguments for originalism are actually
arguments for law reform—calls to depart from today’s law,
not to apply it. That the departure might resemble some past
state of affairs doesn’t make it any less of a departure. (No matter how good his normative arguments, a latter-day Tory hoping to restore British rule would be planning to change U.S.
law, not to enforce it.)
These issues aren’t just for legal sticklers; they’re problems
that normative defenders of originalism can’t ignore. If American law today isn’t originalist (or as fully originalist as you’d
like), then knowing that originalism is a good idea in the abstract
doesn’t tell us very much. It’s like knowing that tax rates ought
to be different than they are; that doesn’t mean the Supreme
22. See Green, supra note 20, at xxxix (describing the dispute on this question, on
which this Article takes no view).
23. See Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009)
(suggesting that originalism “is pooh-poohed by most leading jurists in Canada,
South Africa, India, Israel, and throughout most of Europe”); see also Bradley W.
Miller, Origin Myth: The Persons Case, the Living Tree, and the New Originalism, in
THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 120, 121 (Canada); Michel
Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and
Contrasts, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 633, 656 & n.83 (2004) (Europe). But see Yvonne Tew,
Originalism at Home and Abroad, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 780 (2014) (identifying originalist practices in Malaysia and Singapore). See generally David Fontana,
Comparative Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 189 (2010); see also Baude, supra note 1
(manuscript at 43–45).
24. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 4, at 12 (“Originalists agree that our constitutional
practice both is (albeit imperfectly) and should be committed to the principle that
the original meaning of the Constitution constrains judicial practice.”).
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Court should impose new rates by fiat. Whatever the best rules
might be, individual officials may have separate moral reasons
to enforce the law as it exists, whether as special role-obligations
or just as a means of avoiding bad consequences.
This is why it may be dangerous for originalists to tie their
theories too closely to theories of political legitimacy.25 When the
law deserves our obedience is a question of ethics and politics
that’s been debated since long before the Constitution was written.26 If we can’t resolve our disagreements about the Commerce
Clause without first solving the problem of political obligation,
our situation hasn’t improved. And even if originalism were the
only legitimate way to read the Constitution, our legal system
might turn out to be only partially legitimate—just as it might
turn out to be only partially originalist. What our duties would
be in that case is yet another difficult ethical and political question. We might still need to know the law before we can say, definitively, what each of us ought to do.
2.

Originalism as Law Reform

None of this shows that the normative arguments are wrong.
If originalism is a good idea, then it’s a good idea; that’s something worth knowing.
But it’s not everything worth knowing. If originalism is really a
law reform project, then the normative arguments may prove too
much. We could encourage judges and officials to depart from
current law for lots of reasons, none of which have anything to do
with originalism: modernizing government administration, protecting the environment or human rights, preventing war, and so
on. If the Supreme Court could successfully realize your favorite
normative end by nonoriginalist means—declaring nuclear
weapons unconstitutional, creating a libertarian paradise by decree—why should originalism stand in its way?
Most originalists tend to object to such arguments regardless
of the cause in question, and without stooping to argue over
which causes are more worthwhile than others. Originalists
don’t want to fit the stereotype described by their critics, of a

25. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 7, at 2; Lash, supra note 6, at 1442–43.
26. See Andrei Marmor, Legal Conventionalism, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT, supra note
19, at 193, 215.
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political interest group trying to push its policies in the courts.27
They want to argue, from a neutral standpoint, that their views
correspond to legal rules that judges and officials are already
bound to apply.28 When originalists write amicus briefs opposing the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate,29 for example, they tend to say things like “the mandate is unconstitutional,”30 not “the mandate ought to be unconstitutional,” or
“the Supreme Court could make the world a better place by
reading the Constitution so as to forbid the mandate.”31
This kind of phrasing isn’t just lawyer’s talk, or bad faith, or
even confusion about the nature of the originalist project. As
Matt Adler notes, originalists and nonoriginalists both make
these kinds of claims—and seem to believe them—without
much attention to the underlying legal theories.32 That’s not surprising, because while relatively few people have thought much
about jurisprudence, lots of people (officials, judges, lawyers,
conscientious citizens) want to know what the law is, not just
what it ought to be. If normative justifications for originalism
have nothing to say to such people, then that’s a problem with
the justifications, and we should look for something better.
B.

Conceptual Defenses of Originalism

If a defense of originalism has to be rooted in American law,
what might that defense look like? Conceptual defenses start
down that road by combining legal arguments with philosophical claims about meaning and interpretation. For example,
everyone seems to think that the Constitution’s meaning is relevant to our law. And if the meaning of a text always and eve27. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The
Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 546, 560 (2006).
28. Cf. About Us, FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR L. & PUB. POL’Y STUD., http://www.fedsoc.org/aboutus/ [http://perma.cc/9Q8T-5FD7] (last visited Aug. 14, 2014) (“[I]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, not
what it should be”).
29. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(b) (2012).
30. Brief of Authors of The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Independence Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs. v. Florida (No. 11–398), decided sub nom. NFIB v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
31. Cf. Rappaport, supra note 1 (arguing that normative arguments can be appropriate if the law doesn’t yet resolve the question).
32. See generally Matthew D. Adler, Interpretive Contestation and Legal Correctness,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1115 (2012).
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rywhere depends on “original” facts—what its author originally intended it to mean,33 what a reasonable reader in its historical context would have taken it to mean,34 and so on—then the
Constitution’s meaning depends on those “original” facts too.
We could sketch out the conceptual defense, again too simplistically, as something like this:
(C1) Our constitutional law is determined by the meaning
of the document’s text.
(C2) The meaning of a text is its original meaning.
 (C3) Our constitutional law is determined by the original
meaning of the document’s text.

Here, too, most of the controversy has focused on the second
step. There are plenty of contradictory candidates for the One
True Meaning of a text (speaker’s intentions, readers’ understandings, and so on); even originalists disagree about which to
use.35 But, as before, the real problem with the argument is at
step one. Even assuming that, after all our philosophizing, one
type of meaning will emerge triumphant, that still leaves us
with a problem. Our constitutional law might include more
than just the meaning of the document’s text. The real disputes
over “interpretation” aren’t actually interpretive at all; they’re
about the sources and content of our law, which depend on
facts about our society today and not at the Founding. No matter what interpretive method we use, that method could be
rendered irrelevant or obsolete depending on what else is in
the law.
1.

What Interpretation Can’t Do

Part of what makes debates over “constitutional interpretation” so frustrating is that the participants often seem to have
different concepts in mind. Suppose that, according to your favorite interpretive method, you read the original Constitution to
say X. Someone like Bruce Ackerman might still say, “Sure, the
Constitution’s text originally said X, but we amended it to Y
33. See supra note 9.
34. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006); see also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Case for Originalism, in
THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 42, 48.
35. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 43–47, 53–55
(2009).
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during Reconstruction, the New Deal, and/or the Civil Rights
Era.” 36 True, those “amendments” didn’t follow the (original)
constraints of Article V. But that’s not a problem for Ackerman,
who can just say that our legal system happens to permit certain
informal or extraconstitutional amendments: Article V is one
way of making amendments, but there are other ways too.37
Similarly, someone like Philip Bobbitt (or David Strauss,
Richard Fallon, or Mitch Berman and Kevin Toh) might say,
“Sure, the Constitution’s text originally said X, but the text isn’t
the exclusive source of constitutional law. Constitutional law
also comes from judicial precedents, important statutes, common-law understandings, longstanding traditions and practices, the ethos of America, norms of prudence, and maybe some
other things too.”38 Canada’s constitution, for example, is said
to include not only certain written instruments “but also ‘usage
and convention,’” as well as “constitutional doctrine—the principles and rules derived from the written constitution.”39 How
do we know that ours is any different?
We normally talk about disputes like these as being about
“constitutional interpretation”: Some people think that precedent matters for interpretation, say, and others don’t. But talking that way just causes confusion. As Timothy Endicott points
out, “interpretation”—in the sense that conceptual defenses use
the word—is about the proper way to read something; it
“comes into play when there is a possibility of argument as to
[a text’s] meaning.”40 Once we know the communicative content well enough, once “there is no question as to how a person
is to be understood,”41 then we’re done interpreting. But we
might still not be done figuring out the law; there might be ex36. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 8–9
(2014) (Civil Rights Era); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS
7–13 (1998) (Reconstruction and New Deal).
37. See ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 36, at 329; ACKERMAN,
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 36, at 15–17.
38. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 7–8, 93 (1982); DAVID A.
STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 3 (2010); Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh,
Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1739, 1751
(2013); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of
Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1122–23 (2008).
39. Miller, supra note 23, at 132.
40. Timothy Endicott, Legal Interpretation, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 109, 112 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012).
41. Id. at 121.
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tratextual sources of legal authority to consider (precedent,
longstanding tradition, the American ethos, and so on). We
can’t rule them out by doing a better job of interpreting text;
the point is that they’re extratextual, and so have to be defended
or rejected on other grounds.
As an example, think of constitutional disputes in the United
Kingdom, which doesn’t have a written constitution. Whether
the U.K. has really become part of the European Union, such
that E.U. law trumps U.K. law regardless of what Parliament
says, can’t be settled simply by interpreting various acts of Parliament. The U.K. Parliament could always declare that it’s supreme, but then again the European Parliament could always
disagree. Likewise, whether the current Parliament can bind a
future Parliament—the traditional answer is no42—isn’t a question that statutes can settle; new ones could be written taking
either side, and we’d still need to decide which is right.
The same arguments apply to the United States. Even if part
of the Constitution’s text called for a particular interpretive
method,43 that provision could have been superseded by practice as much as any other. Whether practice has overtaken text
is something text alone can’t settle.44 One could say that these
fights are still about “interpretation” of our legal practices writ
large, but that’s a nonstandard use of the term. What’s clear is
that these aren’t fights about how to read a particular text, but
rather about the legal authority that this text wields.
In fact, most of the time, no one actually disagrees about interpretation anyway. Most everyone accepts that some kind of
original meaning is legally relevant sometimes; the only live
disputes are what kind of original meaning, how much it contributes, and whether and when other sources can validly sup42. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90 (“Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not.”).
43. See, e.g., Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as
the Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607 (2009) (arguing that it does); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for its
Own Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2009) (same).
44. Cf. Stefan Sciaraffa, The Ineliminability of Hartian Social Rules, 31 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 603, 620 (2011) (noting that “whether a written constitution is live or
a dead letter comes in degrees,” as official or popular customs “may reference
some provisions of the constitution and ignore others”); Baude, supra note 1
(manuscript at 13) (“[E]ven those who would not go so far as to say that document itself has been superseded might say that our legal rules for understanding that
document have been superseded.”).
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plement or supplant that meaning. 45 Only a small group of
scholars really argue (whether for theoretical reasons or practical ones) that we’re bound by the current meaning of the Constitution’s words, whatever their original meaning might have
been.46 Arguments that we should sometimes use judicial precedent, traditions, or the American ethos in place of original
meaning are only rarely intended as serious claims about the
meaning of language. (How could a judicial decision or shifting
normative concerns change the communicative content of a
written document? Why don’t other legal documents, like draft
constitutions that were never enacted, also change over time in
this way?)47 Instead, these claims about precedent and tradition
are usually intended as claims about different sources of law,
or different factors that official descisionmakers ought to consider; or, if they aren’t so intended, they could be redescribed
that way without much loss.
To put it more generally, knowing how to read the Constitution’s text doesn’t tell us why we care what it says.48 Whatever
the right interpretive method might be, we can apply it to all
sorts of documents—an old newspaper article, 49 a restaurant
order,50 a recipe for fried chicken51—without any of them being
part of our law. One of the attractions of conceptual arguments
is that they reference everyday methods for interpreting many
different types of documents. 52 But that broad application is
45. See Berman, supra note 35, at 10 & n.21 (arguing that few scholars deny that
originalism “should count among the data that interpreters treat as relevant”); see
also H. Jefferson Powell, On Not Being “Not an Originalist,” 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
259, 265 (2010) (describing “original-meaning arguments” as “simply one mode of
argument among many”).
46. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 6–7 (1960); Tom W.
Bell, The Constitution as if Consent Mattered, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 269, 271 (2013); Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation,
and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L.
REV. 1485 (2012); cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87
MICH. L. REV. 20, 49 (1988) (making a similar suggestion for statutes).
47. See Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Misunderstood Relationship Between Originalism
and Popular Sovereignty, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 485, 488–89 (2008).
48. See generally Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional
Interpretation, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 1025 (2010).
49. See Prakash, supra note 47, at 487.
50. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 9, at 975.
51. See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823,
1825 (1997).
52. See Prakash, supra note 47, at 487–89.
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also why the conceptual defense really needs its first premise—
that the document’s text is authoritative for us, that it serves as
the ultimate source of our supreme law.53 And in defense of
this premise, the philosophy of language has nothing to say.
2.

Interpretation and Theories of Jurisprudence

The first step in the conceptual defense isn’t an interpretive
claim, but what we might call a “jurisprudential” one—a claim
about the sources and content of our law. Stating the problem
this way gives us a rough understanding of the dispute: The
originalist and the pluralist simply disagree on which sources
matter.54 To date, this disagreement has been mostly implicit,
which has made it harder to resolve.55 But it’s still possible that
social facts ultimately provide the answer, and that this answer
supports the originalist view. (For example, maybe society really
does give preeminent authority to the Constitution’s text, which
is why those other sources—purpose, precedent, tradition, etc.—
have sought the cachet of “interpretation” for so long.)
Sophisticated conceptual originalists have long defended
their views based not only on theories of meaning, but also on
theories of legal authority. To commission some people to enact a Constitution, the argument goes, is to take their instructions as authoritative. So, when we interpret their work, we
should look for the instructions they were trying to convey.
Why else would we consult what they wrote, if not for the instructions that we asked them to write?56
Phrasing the argument in these terms, though, also raises new
problems. If the conceptual defenses themselves depend on contingent features of U.S. law—if they aren’t just the product of the
philosophy of language—then they can be undone by those
same contingent features. Even putting to one side separate
sources of law like precedent, the correct method of interpreting
a constitutional text might itself be determined by social facts.
53. See Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, supra note 9, at 94.
54. See Berman & Toh, supra note 38; see also Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh,
On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2013).
55. See Matthew D. Adler, Social Facts, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Rule of
Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 193, 193
(Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009); Adler, supra note 32.
56. See Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, supra note 9, at 539–41.
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Suppose, for example, that interpretive method A is the only
one that’s philosophically correct, but the French legal system
actually interprets their constitution using method B (which
might be nonoriginalist, or the wrong kind of originalist,
or . . . ). French lawyers know about the philosophical debates,
but they’re committed to their own traditional method; committed all the way down, in principle as well as in practice. An
originalist might criticize this choice on policy grounds, or
maybe on conceptual grounds (they’re “reading it wrong”)—
but not on legal grounds, at least not without renouncing positivism. How could the entire society be getting its own law
wrong, all the way down? It’d be one thing if French law explicitly required philosophical correctness, and the lawyers
mistakenly thought they were complying. In that case, the collective error would be easy to explain.57 But if the French practice is to ignore the philosophers and to derive legal rules by
reading their own constitution in their own specific way, how
can we say that this social practice is legally “incorrect”?
In other words, the right method of interpretation isn’t always a philosophical question; there might be law on the subject, too. All sorts of laws are based on mistaken reasoning of
one kind or another—tobacco subsidies, rent control, etc.—but
that doesn’t stop them from being laws. Similarly, a legal system can use philosophically defective rules of evidence or
proximate causation if it wants; what the law is and what it
ought to be are different things. As Judge Frank Easterbrook
once put it, believing in nonoriginalist interpretation is like believing in infant baptism: “Hell yes, I’ve seen it done!”58
Given that a great many legal systems read their written constitutions in nonoriginalist ways,59 the claim that originalism is
necessarily or conceptually required by a written constitution is
hard to credit.60 And if originalism depends on social facts in
other countries, then presumably it depends on social facts
here too. How do we know that America isn’t actually like
France? That’s an empirical question, one that can’t be settled
by conceptual ruminations about interpreting texts. And even
57. See Sachs, supra note 1, at 2268–72 (discussing “global error” in law).
58. Frank H. Easterbrook, Alternatives to Originalism?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
479, 479 (1996).
59. See supra note 23.
60. See generally Coan, supra note 48.
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if American law is originalist, it might be the wrong kind of
originalist: it might focus on the reader’s understanding rather
than the speaker’s intent, or vice versa. In the end, discovering
the One True Meaning won’t get us very far; any actual defense
of originalism has to rest on other grounds.
C.

Positive Arguments for Originalism

Is our law originalist or not? Originalists ought to confront
the question head-on. On the surface, the law might not look
very originalist; but it has deeper features that might well support another view. This Article offers only a rough sketch of
what a positive defense of originalism might look like; but this
sketch, if it seems promising, can be filled in over time.
To greatly oversimplify (again), a positive defense of
originalism might look something like this:
(P1) Whatever is supported by the right kind of social
facts is part of our law.
(P2) Originalism is supported by the right kind of social
facts.
 (P3) Originalism is part of our law.

At first glance, this argument looks pretty weak. The first
step is broadly accepted by positivists, but only because it
leaves out key details: which social facts are “the right kind,”
how they “support” legal claims, what counts as being “part of
our law,” or even what “originalism” is supposed to mean.
Some of these details are left out by necessity. For example,
even experts disagree about exactly which social conditions
make something the law. 61 Everyone accepts the broad outlines: Americans look to the U.S. Code in a way that Swedes
don’t, and so on. But on contested issues, the details matter.
Before we can evaluate a positive defense, we need to know if
those details support originalism.
Even worse, there’s a lot of nonoriginalism in our everyday
practice. Whichever social facts actually determine the law, a reasonable theory might well look to the actions of judges and officials, the doctrines we make students learn in con law class or for
the bar exam, and so on. As Fallon argues, this everyday practice
of constitutional law “sometimes permits deviations from the
61. See generally Adler, supra note 20.
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original understanding and even from the superficially plain
meaning of [the text].”62 Modern originalism began as a criticism
of what courts were doing, not as a summary of their behavior.63
Several decades later, self-identified originalists are still a minority among judges, officials, and law professors.64 How can our law
be originalist, if our practices and personnel aren’t?
That said, there are also reasons for the originalist to hope.
Without having solved all of jurisprudence, we can make some
plausible guesses about which social facts matter—plausible
enough for ordinary lawyers to make accurate legal judgments
on a routine basis. And without conducting sociological studies
or opinion polls,65 plenty of legal practices are familiar enough
to be seen from the armchair, some of which may support
originalist claims. (By way of example, language emerges from
social practice in complicated ways, too—but you don’t usually
need opinion polls to tell you how to speak.)
And everyday practice isn’t the only kind of practice we care
about. As I’ve contended at length in other work—and what
follows is necessarily in abbreviated form—the law depends
more on the shared foundations of our legal reasoning than on
the particular conclusions we reach or actions we take. Like
parenting, law involves a good deal of “do what we say, not
what we do.”66 A clear-eyed sociologist might describe lawyers
and judges as following a very different set of day-to-day rules
than what we all think the law actually prescribes: “distort prior cases, advance political agendas, serve elite opinion or
amour-propre, discount the claims of ethnic or religious minorities,” etc. This external observer, like the Holmesian “bad
man,” might care only about rules that predict how officials

62. Fallon, supra note 38, at 1117.
63. See supra note 10.
64. See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 667 (2009).
65. Some have tried. See, e.g., Donald L. Drakeman, What’s the Point of Originalism?, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1123, 1133 & n.42, 1134–35 (2014) (noting that a
small majority of Americans prefer that the Supreme Court base rulings “on its
understanding of what the U.S. Constitution meant as it was originally written,”
rather than “its understanding of what the U.S. Constitution means in current
times,” and that even those in the latter camp think original meaning is “one of
various factors that should be considered”). But cf. HART, supra note 20, at 117
(arguing that the practice of officials determines the law, not the beliefs of the
public they serve).
66. Sachs, supra note 1, at 2266.
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will act—but that’s a misleading picture of the law as a whole.67
Fully understanding the law means trying on the “internal”
perspective of a faithful participant in the system.68 We need to
know the social facts of how these participants conventionally
justify their legal positions, the arguments they’re willing to
accept and defend in public, and which legal rules they profess
to derive from other rules or to hold on their own.69
Sometimes our accepted arguments and our accepted conclusions might point in different directions. That is, there might
be conflict between our general legal principles and our supposedly derivative beliefs about particular rules. Imagine that a
statute on which we’ve long relied turns out to have been repealed many decades ago;70 imagine that it was a criminal statute, and that recognizing the long-past repeal would mean letting lots of people out of prison. Maybe this statute would be
so important, or the crime it addresses so awful, that we
wouldn’t let it go after the repeal became known. Maybe we’d
keep the prisoners behind bars anyway, inventing new legal
justifications to preserve our everyday legal practices intact. If
that happened, though, it’d clearly be a change to our law, not a
reflection of its current rules as applied to some unexpected
facts. Our law isn’t a prediction of what we’ll do when push
comes to shove, any more than it’s a prediction of what courts
will do in ordinary circumstances. Our law is what’s currently
required by the higher-order principles that we currently accept and defend.71
When we look to these higher-order principles, the case for
originalism is far stronger. Originalist claims are standard features of our legal practice—something nonoriginalists have occasionally recognized (to their dismay).72 As William Baude has

67. Compare O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–61
(1897), with HART, supra note 20, at 88–91, 136–38.
68. HART, supra note 20, at 89.
69. See Sachs, supra note 1, at 2265–68.
70. Cf. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439
(1993) (presenting the opposite scenario, in which a statute hadn’t been repealed
even though, for many decades, the U.S. Code’s compilers thought it had).
71. For an extended argument on this point, see Sachs, supra note 1, at 2273–76.
72. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 36, at 32–33 (“In
America today, the official canon is composed of the 1787 Constitution and its
subsequent formal amendments.”); STRAUSS, supra note 38, at 29 (complaining
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persuasively argued, courts and officials labor mightily to
avoid anything that smacks of open rebellion against the text or
its original meaning, however understood. 73 Instead, they
downplay potential conflicts by pointing to historical ambiguities,74 applying old rules to new facts,75 and so on. Maybe that
kind of practice—taking original meaning as a constraint on
other sources of law, without necessarily explaining where
those other sources came from—is enough to support a positive defense. Yet this Article tries to go further, moving beyond
a negative vision of originalism-as-constraint to an affirmative
vision that synthesizes our reliance on original history with our
other legal commitments. If this picture of our practices seems
familiar enough, then it might support a belief that—despite
appearances—originalism is actually our law.
II.

ORIGINALISM AS THE FOUNDERS’ LAW

If originalism is really a theory of our law, what theory is it?
This Article presents originalism as a theory of legal change: Our
law is still the Founders’ law, as it’s been lawfully changed.
The motivation here is simple. One problem with the conceptual defense was that, even if we knew what the text meant at
the Founding, this meaning might have been superseded since.
This theory takes that basic problem and generalizes it. Even if
we knew what the law was at the Founding, based on the meaning of text or whatever else, this law might have been superseded since. The basic, most essential claim of originalism is
that the Founders’ law has not been superseded—that the “origthat, in our system, “[c]onstitutional law is supposed to consist in the interpretation of a written text,” as opposed to common-law reasoning from precedents).
73. See Baude, supra note 1 (manuscript at 20–32); see also, e.g., Goldsworthy,
supra note 34, at 56 (“Even when judges purport to enforce unenumerated, supposedly implied principles, they invariably claim to have discovered those principles in the constitution, not added them to it.”); Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional
and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 268, 301 n.36 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002)
(“Matters become somewhat more complicated if one thinks that courts consistently employ an originalist rhetoric that persuades citizens, who do not quite
acknowledge that a number of decisions they like fail under originalist standards.”); Sachs, supra note 1, at 2282–84.
74. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561, 2567–68 (2014).
75. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966); Home Bldg.
& Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); see also Sachs, supra note 1, at 2283
(discussing these cases).
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inal” law, whatever it was, is still law for us today. We may
have changed it over time, but only because the law itself provided for means of change.
Everyone knows that legal systems change over time. Sometimes those changes comply with the system’s own rules for
lawmaking; sometimes they don’t. At any particular time,
though, a legal system combines a practical acceptance of certain past changes with restrictions on how the law is supposed
to change in the future. The American legal system, for example, accepts all sorts of changes made before the Constitution
was adopted. Alleged changes made since the Founding, by
contrast, aren’t accepted as brute historical facts; they need
some kind of legal justification. Even after two hundred years,
we share what some scholars have called “constitutional continuity” with the Founding.76
Like everything else in law, this claim has to be based on contingent social facts. Not every legal system has to work this way,
and many don’t. But in our system, explaining when something
became the law is an important part of establishing how it became
the law, and in turn to showing that it became the law. This practice, and our choice of the Founding as a unique starting point,
makes it plausible that originalism is part of our law.
A.

Two Kinds of Legal Change
1.

Authorized Change

Legal systems typically contain rules of two different kinds.
Some we could call “substantive rules,” like “don’t steal” or
“don’t murder.” But others are “rules of change,” which authorize alterations or amendments to the system’s existing rules. Article V amendments are classic examples; so are statutes, treaties,
shifts in recognized custom and usage, and so on.77

76. See Joseph Raz, Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT, supra note 19, at 1, 11 nn.21–22 (discussing the work of
Hans Kelsen). See generally B.J. Spagnolo, Kelsen and Raz on the Continuity of Legal
Systems: Applying the Accounts in an Australian Context (2013) (unpublished D Phil
dissertation, University of Oxford) (on file with author).
77. Cf. J.M. Finnis, Revolutions and Continuity of Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (2d ser.) 44, 48 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973) (discussing “rules of succession of rules”).
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One important consequence of having rules of change is that,
until something happens to trigger those rules, everything that’s
already in the system is supposed to stay the same. That’s what
it means to have rules of change: if the rules aren’t satisfied,
there’s no change. We regularly treat unrepealed statutes as law,
for example, whether they were passed a century ago or in the
last legislative session.78 They might be superseded by a constitution or a treaty; they might be undone by sunset clauses or
doctrines like desuetude;79 but unless something else in the law
acts to get rid of them, they quietly stick around. (In H.L.A.
Hart’s “picturesque example,” a woman “was prosecuted in
England and convicted” in 1944 “for telling fortunes in violation
of the Witchcraft Act, 1735.”80) When we pass new statutes, we
use traditional canons of construction—such as that implied repeals are disfavored, or that statutes in derogation of the common law are narrowly construed81—to fit them in with their unrepealed fellows on the books.82 The last-in-time rule, that new
law trumps old law, wouldn’t even occur to us but for a presumption that old law otherwise remains in place.83 To paraphrase Newton’s First Law of Motion, a statute at rest tends to
remain at rest, unless acted upon by an outside force.
The same is true of every other legal object. Someone who
owned Blackacre a year ago presumably owns it today, unless
something legally interesting happened in the meantime (a
sale, a bequest, eminent domain, and so on). Contracts stay
contracts and torts stay torts, absent some rule to tell us otherwise. As John Finnis describes, this kind of stability is “a work78. See 2 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 34.1, at 31–32 (7th ed. 2009) (describing the “basic principle of
law . . . that, unless explicitly provided to the contrary, statutes continue in force until
abrogated by subsequent action of the legislature.”); Jack M. Balkin, Must We Be Faithful to Original Meaning?, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 57, 59 (2013) (noting that
“laws, even ancient laws, continue in force . . . until they are modified or repealed”).
79. Cf. Note, Desuetude, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2209, 2209 (2006) (noting regretfully
that, within the United States, desuetude “currently enjoys recognition in the
courts of West Virginia and nowhere else”).
80. HART, supra note 20, at 61 (citing R v. Duncan, (1944) 1 K.B. 713).
81. See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 936–37 (1992); see also Sachs, supra note 110, at 1840–41.
82. Cf. HART, supra note 20, at 64 (noting that “Victorian statutes and those
passed by the Queen in Parliament today surely have precisely the same legal
status in present-day England”).
83. I owe this point to Jessica Bulman-Pozen.
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ing postulate of legal thought,” one “so fundamental that it is
scarcely ever identified and discussed.”84
Perhaps societies and legal systems don’t have to operate this
way, but there are some excellent reasons why they do. We
make laws to govern things to come, not things as they are. “At
least until we devise time machines,” the D.C. Circuit once noted, “a change can have its effects only in the future.”85 This
prospective lawmaking doesn’t work, as Judge Easterbrook
points out, unless the “[d]ecisions of yesterday’s legislatures”
have continuing legal force: “[A]ffirming the force of old laws
is essential if sitting legislatures are to enjoy the power to make
new ones.”86 Rather than have Congress reinvent the wheel in
every new session, we treat our existing law as valid until
something invokes our rules of change. Leaving the law in
place in this way lets people find out what it is, and it avoids
presenting legislators with a moving target.
Keeping legal rules in place until they’re lawfully changed
also goes a long way toward maintaining the rule of law. The
rules of change we have, like other legal rules, might be general
or specific, vague or precise; there might be legitimately hard
questions about whether a particular change is authorized or
not. But in any legal system worthy of the name, the rules of
change have to have a certain amount of exclusivity or closure.
They can’t be generally agnostic as to other methods of changing the law, at least not without casting everything else in the
system into doubt. (Did that gentle breeze or passing cloud just
repeal the tax code? How would you know, absent a rule one
way or the other?) We can imagine a legal system with rules
that permit no changes, but a legal system that has no rules of
change looks more like Calvinball.87
In other words, everyone who actually wants some law also
wants some rules of change, rules that mostly act by keeping
things the same. (Anyone who says otherwise is lying about
84. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 268 (1980).
85. Bergerco Canada v. OFAC, 129 F.3d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Williams, J.);
accord JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 26 (2001).
86. Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1119, 1120 (1998).
87. See Calvinball, THE CALVIN & HOBBES WIKI, http://calvinandhobbes.wikia.
com/wiki/Calvinball (last visited Aug. 17, 2014) [http://perma.cc/PE35-GMVX]
(“Calvinball is a game invented by Calvin in which one makes the rules up as one
goes along.”).
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wanting some law.) Complaints about the “dead hand,” to be
taken seriously, can’t just be complaints that we’re still governed by older law—that’s a basic feature of legal systems, and
something no sensible person would wish to live without. The
real complaint is that the rules of change we have aren’t as
democratic or easy-to-use as they ought to be. But what the law
is and what it ought to be are different things, and the law we
have includes its own rules for legal change.
2.

Unauthorized Change

If the law is supposed to stay the same until it’s lawfully
changed, then we can use that feature as a test of current rules. If a
rule is said to be part of the law today, we can ask how it got
there, and we can expect a certain kind of story in return. Think of
chains of title: if you want to claim Blackacre, you have to show
how you got it (e.g., from C, who got it from B, who got it from
A, . . . ), and only certain explanations are good ones. So we could
imagine the following story being told about legal rules: Something is part of the law if and only if it was lawfully added (at t3,
which altered the law from t2, . . . ), with each step representing a
valid, authorized, constitutionally continuous change to the law.
The problem with this story, though, is that authorized changes aren’t the only kind. Chains of title don’t go all the way back,
and neither do chains of legal justification. (Otherwise, we’d
have an infinite regress: Where did the rules of change come
from? Under what rules were they added to the law? Etc.) Law
being dependent on social facts, it evolves as society does; but
societies don’t have to evolve according to any particular rules,
and usually they don’t. Nations get invaded, governments get
overthrown, perfectly valid rules get abandoned or forgotten,
and so on. It’d be absurd to insist on legal compliance all the
way back—concluding, say, that our law today is invalid because the Constitution disobeyed the Articles of Confederation,
the Revolution disobeyed British law, the colonists disobeyed
Native American law, and so on, back to the Norman Conquest
and beyond. In other words, just because things are legally supposed to change only in certain ways doesn’t mean that they actually do. The alterations in legal rules that actually occur as a
matter of social fact, and that don’t obey the preexisting rules,
we can refer to as unauthorized changes to the law.
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Combining the Two

In any real-world legal system, the law is a product of both
authorized and unauthorized changes. The two kinds might
seem to sit uneasily with each other. Some scholars have even
suggested that they’re incompatible, that each unauthorized
change kills off the existing legal system (like a tiny coup
d’état) and replaces it with another.88 To others, that seems a
little drastic. According to Joseph Raz, English law underwent
an unauthorized change in 1966, when the House of Lords asserted a power to overrule precedents;89 it’d be odd to say that
1966 marked the destruction of the English legal system as we
knew it. 90 But how can a legal system really combine both
kinds of changes at once? How can it have rules of change if it
doesn’t actually have to follow them in practice?
In fact, we manage to recognize and comply with both authorized and unauthorized changes all the time. To take a concrete example, suppose the President announced tomorrow
that “all state and local jaywalking laws are hereby repealed.”
This isn’t something that, under our current rules of change,
the President can actually do. So a competent American lawyer
should say that the decree is legally ineffective—in the same
way that, per Marbury v. Madison, “an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.”91
But it’s always possible, notwithstanding this legal conclusion, that the President’s gambit would work. Suppose that officials started acting as if the jaywalking laws had been repealed,
that codifiers started removing them from the statute books,
and so on. If enough people—and the right people—started
accepting the decree as valid, all the way down, then at some
88. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 219–20 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945); id. at 368–69 (“[T]he State and its legal order remain the same only
so long as the constitution is intact or changed according to its own provisions.”); cf.
Michael Steven Green, Legal Revolutions: Six Mistakes About Discontinuity in the Legal
Order, 83 N.C. L. REV. 331, 332–33 (2005) (describing any “break in the continuity of
the legal order,” no matter how small, as “a legal revolution”).
89. See Raz, supra note 76, at 11 n.22 (discussing Practice Statement (Judicial
Precedent), [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234 (H.L.)).
90. See HART, supra note 20, at 123 (“[T]he expression ‘the same legal system’ is too
broad and elastic to permit unified official consensus on all the original criteria of legal
validity to be a necessary condition of the legal system remaining ‘the same.’”); Raz,
supra note 76, at 11 (criticizing Kelsen’s view); see also Finnis, supra note 77 (same).
91. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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point a positivist would have to say that American law had
undergone an unauthorized change, and that the jaywalking
laws really had been repealed.92
Everyone implicitly accepts some of these unauthorized
changes already. Our legal system doesn’t worry about whether the Constitution was authorized by the Articles, just like we
don’t worry about the legality of the Revolution, colonization,
or the Norman Conquest. That doesn’t mean that we give up
on the idea of rules of change—that we throw up our hands
and say, “the law is whatever it is today,” or “the law is whatever society currently accepts.” Those responses are tautologies, at least for a positivist; they don’t tell us anything we
didn’t know already. At any given time, the law as it stands has
some contentful substantive rules and some meaningful constraints on how those rules may change. (Without those constraints, the substantive rules would lose their content; that’s
the problem with Calvinball.) Our law requires us, at one and
the same time, to overlook past violations and to commit to being rule-governed in the future; to go, and sin no more.
To put it another way: to adhere to our current law, from the internal perspective of a faithful participant, means accepting the
past changes that it accepts, wherever they came from. But it also
means recognizing, from now on, only the future changes that are
authorized by our rules of change. Of course we know, from reading history, that our law didn’t emerge in pure fashion like Venus
rising from the sea—and that it might be altered unlawfully in the
future, if society rejects its constraints. At that point, like a Jacobite
after the Glorious Revolution, we might have to revise our internal commitments, at least if we choose to be faithful to society’s
new rules. But until that happens, we have sound legal reasons to
reject any attempts at unauthorized change.
B.

Originalism and Legal Change

We can now see how to state originalism as a theory of legal
change. When a given set of laws is in force, those laws are
supposed to change only in law-governed ways, with a legal
92. In fact, presidents have actually tried something like this by purporting to
terminate treaties—a power once thought to reside exclusively with Congress, or
perhaps with the President-and-Senate, but that the Executive has repeatedly
claimed with little effective opposition. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773 (2014).

No. 3]

Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change

845

justification for each new step. But we’ve still got to start
somewhere. Originalism starts by assigning the legal system an
origin, namely the Founding. That means it accepts the law as it
stood at the Founding, regardless of how it got that way. But
from the Founding on, it requires that changes be lawful—that
is, that they be made under rules of change that were already
law at the time, whether those rules were there at the Founding
or were lawfully added since.
If this picture is right, then we could roughly (and recursively) define originalism as making the following three claims
about the law of the United States:
(1) All rules that were valid as of the Founding remain valid over time, except as lawfully changed.
(2) A change was lawful if and only if it was made under a
rule of change that was valid at the time under (1).
(3) No rules are valid except by operation of (1) and (2).

This recursive definition might sound strange, but it’s how we
commonly think about the Constitution’s text.93 We typically recognize something as part of “the text” if it was in the original
Constitution or was added by an Article V amendment. But if we
used an Article V amendment to create a new amendment procedure (say, ratification by referendum), we could then add to the
text through that procedure too. So another way of describing the
text is to define it recursively, as whatever was in the original
Constitution plus whatever’s been added through an amendment
procedure that was already in place at the time.
This approach also makes sense as to the Founders’ law as a
whole. In our system, we take the Founders’ legal rules as having a certain sort of prima facie validity; in particular, we don’t
look behind them to determine whether they were lawfully created, under the standards of some earlier time. We also accept a
wide variety of deviations from the substance of the Founders’
rules, when we can give plausible accounts about how those deviations were actually lawful when they occurred. The key
claim—and the most controversial—is the last one: that, at least
at the level of our higher-order commitments, we accept claims
of change only if they’re ultimately rooted in the Founders’ law.

93. I owe this point to John McGinnis.
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The Rules at the Founding

Whether we adhere to the Founders’ law is a claim about our
contemporary law, one that has to be based on contemporary
social facts. But this contemporary law can still incorporate, in
certain ways, the law of an earlier time. As it happens, our
practice is to incorporate the Founders’ law as it stood, without
worrying about how it got that way.
a.

Incorporating Past Law

Incorporating other legal rules by reference is remarkably
common in legal systems. Choice-of-law doctrines, for example, routinely direct us to incorporate the law of some other
society. As Alexander Hamilton reminded his fellow New
Yorkers in The Federalist, the laws “of Japan not less than of
New-York may furnish the objects of legal discussion to our
courts.”94 To determine Japanese law, our legal system usually
just tells us (or incorporates rules of private international law
that tell us) to find out what law actually applies in Japan, using our standard positivist toolbox. 95 From our perspective,
Japanese law is something found, not made; to borrow a distinction made by Leslie Green, U.S. officials “can decide
whether or not to apply” Japanese law, but “they can neither
change it nor repeal it, and [the] best explanation for its existence and content makes no reference to [American] society or
its political system.”96 Our law handles Japanese law the way it
handles “logic, mathematics, principles of statistical inference,
or English grammar,” all of which can be “properly applied in
cases” even though we didn’t make them.97
We use the same approach for the law of the past. (After all,
“[t]he past is a foreign country: They do things differently
there.”98) Think of a property case involving a complex chain of
title. Under the traditional maxim nemo dat quod non habet—one

94. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 555 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
95. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 201, 205(3) (1986);
accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 101, 113 (1962).
96. Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Spring 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/legal-positivism/
[http://perma.cc/R584-HZ2R] (discussing Canadian application of Mexican law).
97. Id.
98. L.P. HARTLEY, THE GO-BETWEEN 17 (N.Y. Review Books 2002) (1953).
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cannot give what he does not have 99 —a present interest in
property might depend on the validity of an old conveyance,
which in turn could depend on the law as it stood at that earlier
time.100 So we might need to know the law of a previous era to
know who owns Blackacre today. We don’t use this rule because we’re forced to do so (in some dead-hand sense) or out of
slavish devotion to our ancestors. Instead, nemo dat is part of
our current law, which we know to be law because of current
social facts, and which we’ve currently chosen to suspend in
some cases and not others.101 The content of the rule just happens to involve a cross-reference to the law of an earlier time;
our law tells us to look up past law, so we do.
Adherence to the Founders’ law works in much the same
way. Our modern legal rules are determined by modern social
facts, but they still instruct us to use the law of an earlier
time.102 That doesn’t make it easy. To find that law, we have to
make a number of difficult historical judgments—even after
we’ve decided, based on positivist theory, what kind of historical evidence ought to matter. But we could face exactly the
same difficulties in figuring out the law of a foreign country, or
determining the validity of some old conveyance. Maybe that’s
just what our law requires; maybe incorporating past rules of
law is what we, today, conventionally do.
In fact, we can adhere to the Founders’ law today even if we
haven’t always done so, and even if there’ve been occasional interruptions along the way. In the choice-of-law context, diplomatic recognition can override positivist theory: when the United States refused to recognize the People’s Republic of China,
our courts were obliged to assume (with some exceptions) that

99. See Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
2097, 2120 (2012).
100. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 547 (1872) (determining
the rights of a downstream licensee “under the prior Patent Act”).
101. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2–403 (1951) (revised 1972) (protecting certain good-faith
purchasers); id. § 3–305 (setting out the holder-in-due-course rule for negotiable
instruments); see generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Laws of
Good Faith Purchase, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1335 (2011).
102. But see MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 46, at 3–4, 6–7 (arguing that present acceptance requires present-centered modes of interpretation); STRAUSS, supra note
38, at 36–38 (suggesting that originalism is inconsistent with a conventional Hartian theory).
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mainland China was actually being governed from Taiwan.103
The same thing can happen with the past: Our law might require
us to ignore what past law actually was, in favor of what we
now say it was. An honest positivist in mid-1650s England
would say that the monarchy had been abolished; but when the
Restoration came in 1660, the official position of English law was
that Charles II had been king for the last twelve years.104 Similarly, in Texas v. White, the Supreme Court recognized the “historical fact” that the Confederate government of Texas, when it was
“in full control of the State, was its only actual government.”105
But because that government was “established in hostility to the
Constitution of the United States,” American courts were dutybound not to regard “its acts as lawful acts,”106 except as permitted by the de facto government doctrine.107
In other words, many U.S. states have already gone through
periods of revolution and interregnum, which we understand
through the lens of post-restoration law. If they can do it, so
can the nation as a whole.108 Whatever our law might have been
before—during the New Deal, say, or the heady days of the
Warren Court—what we’re currently obliged to maintain as a
matter of law and social practice isn’t necessarily what we’ve
103. See, e.g., Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 104 F. Supp.
59, 66 & n.11 (N.D. Cal. 1952); cf. HART, supra note 20, at 119–20 (discussing a hypothetical British statute that declares Tsarist law still in force in Russia).
104. See Declaration of Breda (Apr. 4, 1660), in 11 H.L. JOUR. (1660) 7–8 (U.K.).
105. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 733 (1869).
106. Id. at 732–33.
107. Id. at 733.
108. In fact, the United States can be originalist even if particular states are not. As
used in this Article, “American law” or “the law of the United States” means the law
applicable to the whole country, not just to any one state. Individual states, like foreign countries, might have different legal practices, and some have definitely broken
from their preexisting law. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 296 & n.19, 297 & n.21 (2005); Baude, supra note 1 (manuscript at 42–43).
This doesn’t undermine originalism in general, because U.S. law largely incorporates
state law by reference. See, e.g., Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012). From a
federal perspective, if we want to know the law of North Carolina, we have to look
and see, using the same positivist toolbox that we’d use for Mexico or Japan. Federal
officials can override state law or choose “not to apply it,” but “they can neither
change it nor repeal it”; U.S. law isn’t the source of North Carolina’s law, though it
may superimpose some constraints like equal protection or a republican form of government. Green, supra note 96; accord Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the
Constitution, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note
55, at 1, 23–25. As a result, the law of individual states can change in nonoriginalist
ways and be applied in federal court without U.S. law becoming nonoriginalist too.
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maintained in the past. Just as current practice could easily discard the law of the Founding, choosing to adopt some other
law instead, it can also adopt the law of the Founding, notwithstanding earlier departures therefrom. The best reading of our
legal practices may be that we adhere to the law of the Founding today, whatever the unusual course of history might show.
b.

Incorporating the Founders’ Law

Relying on past law is hardly unusual. What’s distinctive
about American practice, though, is that it relies on the law of
the Founding. We date our legal system, and our requirements
for legal change, from the adoption of the Constitution. If that’s
right, then the Constitution occupies an extremely special place
in American law, more so than we usually think. The key claim
isn’t that the Constitution trumps any law of lesser stature—
though that may also be true, and very important. The salient
claim, for present purposes, is that the Constitution represents
a boundary in time, separating our present legal system from
older systems that we’ve discarded.
When our courts discuss the law of the Founding era, they often accord it a certain kind of prima facie validity, subject to being altered later on. This isn’t just limited to historical arguments
about the constitutional text. The Supreme Court describes state
sovereign immunity, not as a creature of the constitutional text,
but as “a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States
enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which
they retain today . . . except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.”109 In other words,
the Founders had law on the subject, and their law stays good
until we do something about it. Not everyone agrees with the
Court on sovereign immunity; but agree or not, the picture only
makes sense if Founding-era law—whether or not it shows up in
the text—can still continue in force.110
Law that predated the Founding, though, doesn’t always get
the same treatment. When the Court directly applies traditional
rules of unwritten law, as in admiralty cases or state border disputes, it might trace the rules as far back as Blackstone, but rarely
109. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
110. See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813,
1868–75 (2012).
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much further.111 What matters is how the doctrine stood when it
crossed the Atlantic, and then how it developed on this side of the
pond. Whether the colonial-era legal rules displaced older rules of
even longer standing just doesn’t matter for their status today.112
To the extent that the Founding broke from preexisting law, we
don’t let that stand in our way. The nine state conventions that
adopted the Constitution in 1788 complied with Article VII,113 but
they violated the Articles of Confederation, which couldn’t be
amended or overridden without thirteen legislatures’ consent.114
In fact, by accepting a new “supreme Law of the Land,”115 the
conventions may also have violated their own state constitutions,
which didn’t necessarily permit amendments by that means.116
In other words, if our system had to be judged by the standards of the Articles (or before), then we’d reject the Constitution itself as invalid.117 But in our legal system, trying to vali111. See, e.g., Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 409–10 (2009) (noting, in
a maritime case, English practice “[j]ust before the ratification of the Constitution,” as
well as American practice “since at least 1784”); New York v. New Jersey, 523 U.S. 767,
784 (1998) (discussing the effect of accretion and avulsion on state borders).
112. See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 277 (2008)
(“[B]y the time Blackstone published volume II of his Commentaries in 1766, he
could dismiss the ‘ancient common law’ prohibition on assigning choses in action
as a ‘nicety . . . now disregarded.’” (omission in original) (quoting 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442)); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S.
469, 478 (1988) (describing the common law as determining what “lands beneath
waters under tidal influence were given States upon their admission into the Union”); id. at 486 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (attempting “to ascertain the extent of
the King’s rights under English common law,” and bemoaning the lack of “English cases of the late 18th and early 19th centuries” in particular).
113. Cf. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?,
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5–31 (2001) (discussing why the Constitution became
law in 1788, rather than 1787, 1789, or some other year).
114. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII; see also ACKERMAN,
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 36, at 34–36.
115. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
116. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 36, at 36–39; AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES
WE LIVE BY 58–60 (2012).
117. Some academics have tried to explain this away. One recasting of Ackerman’s
theory, for example, describes ratification as legally authorized because it was an act of
true popular sovereignty, and such acts—usually found in five-phase constitutional
moments—have always been permitted by our rules of change. See ACKERMAN,
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 36, at 66–68. Akhil Amar has argued that Articles’
widespread violation rendered them nonbinding under international law, see AMAR,
supra note 108, at 29–33; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 94, at 297–98 (James
Madison), and that the state conventions were exemplars of popular sovereignty for
the time, see AMAR, supra note 108, at 10–18, 308–11; AMAR, supra note 116, at 60–63.
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date the Constitution in terms of preexisting law is both unhelpful and unnecessary. Even if you succeeded, that’d just
push the problem further back, requiring us to decide the legal
status of the Revolution, colonization, the Norman Conquest,
and so on. For contemporary legal purposes, we simply don’t
care. By contrast, it is legally relevant today whether a particular act of Congress, state statute, or judicial decision is consistent with the Constitution of 1788—even if we might have
some other legal reasons, discussed below, to leave a few inconsistencies in place. To the extent that law is a matter of social convention, our thoroughgoing agreement on the Founders’ law (regardless of what might have happened earlier)
makes the Founding the starting point of our law.
This reliance on the Founding isn’t just a matter of American
culture or filial piety, the way many nonoriginalists describe it.118
Many Americans do revere the Founders, but societies’ deep legal
practices usually have more than one reason supporting them.
Parliamentary supremacy in the United Kingdom, as Leslie Green
notes, might “rest, not only on a common practice of treating
[statutes] as supreme, but also on a belief that this practice is
democratic or is central to our culture.”119 Those cultural beliefs
supplement rather than supplant the particular conventions that
constitute our legal practices. American society doesn’t accept the
Telecommunications Act of 1996120 out of filial piety toward Newt
Gingrich and his fellows in the 104th Congress, let alone toward a
Founding generation that never heard of the Internet. We accept it
because it was passed by Congress and has never been repealed.
In the same way, it’s our practice to adhere to the Founders’ law,
as lawfully changed. Whether or not we share the moral and po-

But the new Constitution may have been democratically legitimate, deserving of obedience, and so on, without actually being legal under preexisting rules. See Stephen E.
Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1797, 1825–
28 (discussing this possibility); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, supra note 94, at 264–67
(James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 94, at 297.
118. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1683, 1697 (2012); Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1920 & nn.10–15 (2012) (collecting sources);
Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 790
n.289 (2010); David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1719 (2003).
119. Green, supra note 20, at xxiii.
120. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
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litical traditions of the Founders, we continue a legal tradition that
started at the Founding and that we haven’t abandoned since.121
2.

Changes Since the Founding

The Founders’ rules weren’t fixed in amber. We’ve altered
them in innumerable ways, even on foundational matters. In
our legal practices, though, one reliable way to defend those
changes is to present them as authorized, rather than unauthorized—as continuations of the Founders’ law rather than departures. In other words, it’s part of our higher-order legal rules to
accept what’s lawfully done under the Founders’ rules as law.
Often we explain important developments in our law by describing them as applications of unchanging rules to changing
facts. When we can’t do that, because it’s impossible to deny
that the law has changed, we defend the changes under lawful
rules of change, whether rooted in the Founding era or added
since. And when that won’t work either, because the law has
clearly been violated, we rely on various doctrines found elsewhere in the law to cure the violations or to prevent them from
causing more mischief. Even stare decisis, the most prominent
arrow in the nonoriginalist quiver, commonly functions as one
of these “domesticating doctrines”—and is commonly rooted
in Founding-era sources. The point is not, or at least not yet,
that these are the only kinds of arguments we can make. The
point is that these arguments are thought to be successful, partly because of their connection to the Founders’ law.
a.

Rules and Outcomes

One familiar feature of legal rules is that the same rule can
produce changing outcomes over time. Rules usually take account of various facts about the world; when the facts change,
the outcomes change too.122 As a result, when we try to explain
121. Cf. Balkin, supra note 78, at 68 (“Americans do not understand themselves
as having abandoned their constitution, either in whole or in part.”); David
Couzens Hoy, A Hermeneutical Critique of the Originalism/Nonoriginalism Distinction, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 479, 497 (1988) (“That we feel that the constitutional provisions are still very much present law suggests that we understand ourselves as
having a single tradition (however complex and polysemous), stretching back and
including the context in which the provisions were first written down and ratified.”).
122. See Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555 (2006); see also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 6 (2011).
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a legal development that differs from the Founding era, arguing that it’s simply a change in application is usually taken as a
good argument, even if the outcome diverges from the Founding generation’s specific plans or intentions.
Legal rules can take as their inputs (or incorporate by reference) a variety of different things: empirical facts about the
world, mathematics, social customs, other legal systems’ rules,
perhaps moral judgments, and so on.123 At risk of belaboring
the obvious—though it’s led a few scholars into confusion124—
if these things evolve over time, so does the law. In states that
have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, for example, implied warranties arise from the “usage of trade”;125 as trade usage develops, so will the legal obligations of buyers and sellers.
The Constitution forbids habeas suspensions “unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it”;126 public safety might require a suspension at time t1 but not
t2, and then again at t3. And when the amount of trade across
state lines expands beyond the dreams of the Founders, so will
the significance of the power conferred by the Commerce
Clause,127 even leaving the scope or nature of that power entirely the same. These trends may stray very far from the Founding, but that’s only because of the particular inputs that the
Founders chose to make significant. To paraphrase Christopher
Green, the choice of one legal rule over another “is a choice
about what sorts of changes should make a difference.”128
More importantly, when this distinction is offered in constitutional arguments, it goes a long way toward providing a legally acceptable account of change. In defending the New Deal,
for example, Franklin Roosevelt argued that the Framers “used
specific language” for some purposes and “generality, implication and statement of mere objectives” for others—allowing the
law, “within the Constitution, [to] adapt to time and circum-

123. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text; see also Green, supra note 20,
at xxxix (describing the dispute over moral judgments).
124. See, e.g., Green, supra note 122, at 579–90 (discussing Raoul Berger and Jed
Rubenfeld).
125. U.C.C. § 2-314(3).
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
128. Green, supra note 122, at 583; cf. SHAPIRO, supra note 21, at 335 (describing a
particular plan’s “economy of trust”).
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stance.”129 On commerce, taxes, and spending, Roosevelt said,
the Framers intentionally chose “broad and general language”
that was “capable of meeting evolution and change.”130 Roosevelt didn’t have to make this argument; he could have said, as
many Progressives did, that the preexisting law was constraining and outdated and might need to be cast aside.131 But that
would have been visibly contrary to existing legal norms, in a
way that applying existing law to new facts was not.
For another prominent example, consider Brown v. Board of Education.132 Some people treat Brown’s statement that “[i]n approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868”133 as an
official rejection of prior law by the Court.134 But that statement
merely describes current facts about education as inputs to a rule
about equality. “[T]his problem” is “the effect of segregation itself
on public education,”135 and in solving it, the Court quite obviously “must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life.”136
This kind of explanation is a standard feature of controversial decisions. When the Court upheld a state debt-relief law
under the Contracts Clause, it didn’t assert any new emergency
power to respond to the Great Depression. Instead, it claimed
to be applying implicit limitations already found within the

129. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States, Address on Constitution Day (Sept. 17, 1937), The American Presidency Project, http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15459 [http://perma.cc/HR8S-6RS8].
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 193–94 (1908).
132. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
133. Id. at 492.
134. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1955); Miguel Schor, Foreword: Contextualizing the
Debate Between Originalism and the Living Constitution, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 961, 967
(2011); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The End of Originalism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 83, 88
(2010); cf. Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown® Do for You? Neutral Principles and
the Struggle over the Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1052 (2009)
(“[W]hatever originalism means with respect to other constitutional issues, when
it comes to the Equal Protection Clause and its application to questions of raceconscious government action, the Court seldom looks back beyond Brown.”).
135. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
136. Id. On the relation between Brown and originalist theory, see Sachs, supra
note 1, at 2276–77; Baude, supra note 1 (manuscript at 27–28).
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Clause, whose “prohibition is not an absolute one.”137 When the
Court expanded the ban on poll taxes to state elections, it
claimed to be applying an unchanging requirement of equal
protection in light of the “[n]otions of what constitutes equal
treatment” that “do change.”138 For present purposes, whether
the claims in these two cases were true—or even sincere—is
less significant than the fact that they were made. In fact, from
a positivist standpoint, they might be even more relevant if
they were insincere, because they display the felt pressure of a
conventional norm not to depart from preexisting rules.139
b.

The Founders’ Rules of Change

When it’s clear that the law really has changed, over and above
a change in applications, it’s part of our practice to accept and defend those changes based on lawful rules of change. The Founders might not have planned on slavery’s abolition, income taxes,
or women’s suffrage,140 but they included an Article V that made
those things possible. They might have been repulsed by the idea
of a standing army, but so long as the budget is reapproved every
two years, nothing in the Constitution stands in its way.141 These
are entirely conventional means of legal change, but an awful lot
has been accomplished through them.
The range of potentially lawful changes since the Founding
may be even broader than most originalists are used to. To find
out the Founders’ law, we have to apply our positivist toolbox
to facts about the past. To find out their rules of change, and
what changes have actually been made under them, we have to
look and see. This means that the rules of change—and the
sorts of lawful changes that have been made—depend on history, not constitutional theory, and could upend some conventional views of originalism.
Some people argue, for example, that under the Founders’
law, “a regular course of practice” could (as James Madison put
it) eventually “liquidate & settle the meaning” of obscure pro-

137. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell. 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934) (construing
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1); see also Sachs, supra note 1, at 2283.
138. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
139. See Sachs, supra note 1, at 2283; Baude, supra note 1 (manuscript at 32–34).
140. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XVI, XIX.
141. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
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visions in the Constitution’s text.142 If, according to our positivist toolbox, the right people shared this belief in the right way,
then it could have reflected an actual Founding-era legal rule,
and it could allow certain post-Founding conduct to determine
the Constitution’s legal content. That might seem antithetical to
originalism, which is often portrayed as having laser-like focus
on the Founding moment.143 Yet this analysis is focused on the
Founding moment; the question is what the law was then. The
only reason why liquidation might be lawful, on this picture, is
that it was already part of Founding-era law, or was lawfully
added by something that was.
This kind of originalism was on display in NLRB v. Noel Canning,144 when the Court faced a potential conflict between constitutional text and post-Founding practice. At oral argument,
the Solicitor General suggested that practice could trump clear
constitutional text. 145 Not one Justice took that view. In fact,
though the Court majority found the text ambiguous, 146 it
didn’t simply declare that tradition, as an independent source
of law, could govern in its stead. Rather, the Court took pains
to emphasize the Founding-era support for letting tradition
play this subsidiary role—citing Madison on liquidation, John
Marshall on government practice, and related precedents back
to Stuart v. Laird.147 In other words, it was willing to treat postFounding tradition as a source of law because doing so had already been authorized at the Founding.

142. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (quoting James Madison, Letter to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 450
(G. Hunt ed. 1908)); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 94, at 183 (James
Madison). For more on liquidation, see Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 527–29 (2003); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 910–11 (1985); see also William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1811–
12 (2013); Sachs, supra note 110, at 1806–08.
143. See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Moment, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 473, 502
(1988) (criticizing as “artificial” any “search for some pristine moment of original
understanding”).
144. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
145. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–8, Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (No. 12–
1281); cf. Baude, supra note 1 (manuscript at 21–22) (discussing this exchange).
146. 134 S. Ct. at 2561, 2568.
147. Id. at 2559–60 (citing M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401
(1819); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803); Madison, supra note 143).
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This openness to Founding-era rules of change is an important aspect of our legal practices, because it allows people
with many different methodological commitments to seek shelter in the Founding. Stephen Griffin, for example, takes a rather
dim view of modern originalism, but he also argues that “each
contemporary method of interpretation is the result of a tradition that extends back at least to the adoption of the Constitution”; he describes his preferred “pluralistic theories” as justifying a menagerie of interpretive methods on the basis of
“source[s] of law that preexisted the Constitution, such as statutes and the common law,” which are “understood to be legitimate” in our legal system.148 Other people sometimes argue,
relying on similar intuitions, that the Founders recognized an
amendment process outside of Article V, 149 that they had a
common-law constitution,150 that they accepted “active liberty”
as a constitutional principle,151 and so on.
From this Article’s perspective, all of these can be originalist
arguments.152 If you want to argue that some novel method of
legal change was part of the Founders’ law, go ahead; originalism is a big tent. But your argument only makes a difference if
it’s true. Someone trying to assert an unusual Founding-era rule
has to be ready to show that it was actually law back then, not
just political theory or social custom,153 in a way that’d satisfy a
positivist’s demands. The Founders might have really liked active liberty, but they also might have liked raindrops on roses
and whiskers on kittens; we need to know what was part of
their law. And one reason why modern originalists tend to be
skeptical of these novel methods is that, as a historical matter,
the positive case is usually hard to win.
This ecumenical approach might seem strange. Maybe it’d
even persuade modern originalists to reject the Founders’
law—making the tent so big as to drive them out, lest they have
to share it with all the active-liberty types. In their defense, our
148. Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1195–96.
149. See AMAR, supra note 108, at 295–99.
150. See STRAUSS, supra note 38, at 123.
151 . See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 21, 27–28, 33 (2005).
152. See John Harrison, Enumerated Federal Power and the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1101, 1131 (2011).
153. See HART, supra note 20, at 109 (providing the example of removing one’s hat in
church); Sachs, supra note 117, at 1825–26 (distinguishing law and political theory).
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social conventions don’t have to be the same as the Founders’
were; it’s conceivable that we, today, have a different legal system than they did, and that we only care about Framers’ expectations, determinate rules, and so on. But if that wasn’t what
the law actually provided at the Founding, then it’d be rather
odd for us to give the pronouncements of the Framers and Ratifiers even more legal effect than their contemporaries did.154
That would mean attributing to modern America—in the name
of originalism, no less—a number of legal rules that were never
the law at the Founding and have only been invented since.
Picking and choosing among the Founders’ rules, obeying
some of their doctrines and replacing others, might in the end
produce an arrangement that’s normatively superior to what
they had. But in an important sense, it wouldn’t be very originalist. The Constitution, and the Founders’ legal system as a whole,
was only as crisp and determinate as it actually was.155 As noted
above, why should we try to be more originalist than the Founders, or more Catholic than the Pope? In the absence of a clear
modern consensus for this view, it seems more consistent with
our current conventions to look to our original law, and to the
rules of change—precise or flexible—that it actually contained.
c.

Domesticating Doctrines

No matter how flexible the Founders’ rules were, though,
they haven’t been inviolably observed. Legislatures have
passed unconstitutional laws, courts have made mistaken rulings, ordinary people have committed crimes, and so on. If we
adhere to the Founders’ law, then the natural response is to say
that those unlawful, erroneous, or invalid actions didn’t cause
our legal rules to change. This, too, is reflected in our practice;
that’s why we describe an unconstitutional statute, a judgment
without jurisdiction, or a fraudulent conveyance as “void.”
But that response might seem much too extreme. Of course
our legal rules aren’t pure all the way back;156 but it’s not even
clear that they go back as far as the Founding. Is every nonoriginalist precedent headed to the chopping block, the better

154. Cf. Powell, supra note 142, at 887–88 (making a similar argument).
155. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483 (2014).
156. See supra Part II.A.2.
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to restore the purity of the Founders’ law? And if so, how do
we reconcile the Founders’ law with our present practices?
To answer these questions, it’s important to recognize that we
already deal with similar problems every day, in numerous areas of private and public law. Like every sophisticated legal system, we have a plethora of doctrinal tools to ratify unlawful actions, making them effectively valid even if they weren’t valid ab
initio. Adverse possession is an easy example: what starts as a
trespass can, after enough time and under the right conditions,
eventually turn into good title.157 The doctrine avoids any need
to tear up old arrangements to preserve yet older ones intact;
although the initial dispossession was unlawful, we accept the
subsequent change in ownership as a lawful change because of a
rule that was already part of our law when title passed.
Some domesticating doctrines, like adverse possession, actually
cure legal errors by changing the underlying entitlements. Other
doctrines don’t so much cure the errors as cauterize them, preventing any infection from spreading through the system. When a
court, for example, mistakenly finds that A has better title to
Blackacre than B, preclusion doctrines require us to act as if the
court got it right.158 At the same time, the judgment between A
and B doesn’t bind third parties,159 it can be set aside for fraud,160
it’s reversible on appeal, and so on—none of which would make
sense if A really had better title to Blackacre once judgment issued.
The court’s ruling establishes the law of the case, but not the law.
Our law is full of doctrines that operate in this “as if” way. A
statute of limitations doesn’t eliminate the underlying right; it
just deprives the plaintiff of a remedy in this particular jurisdiction.161 The de facto officer doctrine doesn’t give officers power
they don’t possess; it just prevents subsequent collateral attacks
on their actions.162 And so on.

157. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1–40 (2014) (granting title after 20 years of adverse possession “under known and visible lines and boundaries”). See generally
Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property,
64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667 (1986).
158. See William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1826–27 (2008).
159. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008) (collecting cases).
160. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), (d)(3).
161. See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 518–21, 531–33 (1990).
162. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182–83 (1995).
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To the unfamiliar, these doctrines may seem like lawyer’s
tricks. How can our practices require lawful change, if they accept so many changes we know to have been unlawful? But these
aren’t tricks, any more than preclusion or adverse possession.
There are good reasons for not looking behind a jury’s verdict or
an undisturbed occupancy, and in fact our law tells us not to.
These doctrines are features of our continuing legal practices,
not exceptions. And we allow them to domesticate things we’d
otherwise see as legal errors precisely because we understand
the doctrines themselves, not only to be good ideas, but to have
their own good titles to legal validity in our system.
Moreover, the fact that we need such doctrines shows something important about our practices. When we confront past legal
errors (trespasses, mistaken judgments, officers acting without
authority) we don’t just shrug our shoulders and ignore them, or
point out the policy reasons for and against correcting the law.
Societies develop domesticating doctrines precisely because their
laws demand legal explanations, and not just policy arguments,
for overlooking past violations—even violations that occurred
long ago. Our domesticating doctrines are themselves powerful
evidence of a legal system committed to lawful change.
d.

Stare Decisis

This analysis gives us a useful way to think about stare decisis in an originalist system. It’s surely true that there are many
nonoriginalist precedents on the books, that precedent is a
prominent part of our current legal practice, 163 and that this
state of affairs is widely thought to conflict with originalism.164
Reconciling originalism with precedent has become something
of a cottage industry.165

163. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 38, at 1122–23; Monaghan, supra note 118, at 793;
Matthew Steilen, Reason, the Common Law, and the Living Constitution, 17 LEGAL
THEORY 279, 285 (2011).
164. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent
Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2007); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically
Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005).
165. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare
Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437 (2007); Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1843 (2013); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 803 (2009).
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Viewed as a domesticating doctrine, though, stare decisis
doesn’t seem very threatening to the Founders’ law. In fact, it
seems like evidence in favor. It’s hardly unusual that a good
claim, even a good constitutional claim, might be barred by rules
like laches, waiver, or estoppel; in those cases, we might act as if
the substantive law went against the claimant, even though we
really know otherwise. In the same way, our present practices of
stare decisis might require us to act as if a prior court decision
were correct, even if we suspect that it isn’t. What matters for present purposes is whether we accept and defend that doctrine in
terms of its own historical roots—and, as it happens, we do.
This picture of stare decisis is easiest to explain in the lower
courts. When a three-judge appellate panel issues a ruling, it establishes the law of the circuit, requiring district courts (and maybe also future panels) to decide cases as if the panel’s opinion were
well-reasoned.166 None of this, of course, means that the panel’s
decision is right on the law: Other circuit judges can call for review
en banc, the parties can seek overruling by the Supreme Court,
and so on. We might talk about a particular search-and-seizure
ruling as “the law of the Fourth Circuit,” but we don’t actually
think that the Fourth Amendment requires different things in
Maryland than it does in Delaware. We just mean that if we make
a certain kind of argument in the District of Maryland, we’re likely to lose before the trial court and the court of appeals, and we’ll
have to take our chances on certiorari. This is all highly relevant to
our legal planning (and, perhaps, to qualified immunity167), but
not to the ultimate substance of the law.
This is an extremely common way to handle legal uncertainty
in a hierarchical system. In many areas of government, as Kent
Greenawalt notes, lesser officials “follow what their bosses tell
them about the law”; the “police on the beat” don’t “try to figure
out the law for themselves,” but instead rely on “what their supervisors tell them is legally permitted and legally required.”168
Some officers may even have a legal duty to accept, in most cases,
166. See John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE
L.J. 508, 511 & n.23, 530 & n.88 (2000).
167. See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168. Kent Greenawalt, How to Understand the Rule of Recognition and the American
Constitution, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra
note 55, at 145, 153.
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their superiors’ legal judgment in place of their own—the way the
U.S. Marshals are legally required to “execute all lawful writs,”
whether or not the underlying court decisions were correct.169
The same analysis applies to the Supreme Court. Lower
courts may be required to act as if the Court’s opinion correctly
states the law—something that, again, is immensely relevant to
our legal planning (and has real legal impact in habeas cases).170 So for practical purposes, we speak of the Supreme Court
determining “the law,” just like we talk about “the law of the
Fourth Circuit.”171 But while inferior tribunals have to obey the
Court, they don’t have to agree with it, and neither does anyone else. As Caleb Nelson notes, any modern lawyer would
understand what it means to say that “[t]he Constitution plainly establishes Rule X, but the Supreme Court has interpreted it
to establish Rule Y instead, and the Court is not going to overrule that interpretation.”172
Indeed, not even the Justices see precedent as wholly replacing the underlying law. That’s why, for example, it’s possible for
them to describe stare decisis as “‘a principle of policy’” and
“not an inexorable command.” 173 That’s also why, within the
language of American law, we can sensibly talk of the Court
“overruling” even foundational cases like Marbury 174 or
M‘Culloch v. Maryland175—cases that can be judged “correct” or
“incorrect” according to some external standard—in a way that
we can’t talk about the Court “overruling,” say, the Natural
Born Citizen Clause.176 The point isn’t that the constitutional text
takes primacy, but that external rules of law do—rules that
courts are charged to apply correctly, even if they sometimes fall
169. 28 U.S.C. § 566(c) (2012).
170. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(A), (d)(1)(C), 2254(d)(1), (e)(2)(A)(i), 2255(f)(3),
(h)(2) (2012).
171. See Greenawalt, supra note 168, at 153–57.
172. Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 921, 937 (2013).
173. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563, 578 (2003)
(stating that Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), “was not correct when it
was decided, and it is not correct today,” though in the interim it was fully “authoritative” as precedent).
174. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
175. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819).
176. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; see David A. Strauss, Legitimacy, “Constitutional
Patriotism,” and the Common Law Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 50, 50 (2012).
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short. (The Court often invokes relatively low-status sources of
law—international law to decide border disputes, 177 say—but
that doesn’t mean it can “reinterpret” those rules however it
wants, or redraw all our maps for policy reasons.)
The real originalist question about stare decisis, then, isn’t
whether its results sometimes depart from otherwise-correct answers (of course they do) or replace those answers with new ones
(of course they don’t). The real question is whether this doctrine,
as a domesticating doctrine, has its own good title to being part of
our law—whether it was part of the law at the Founding or has
been lawfully added since. And as it turns out, arguments to this
effect are legion. People say that the “judicial power” necessarily
requires a doctrine of precedent,178 that the Constitution makes
federal judges its supreme expositors,179 that stare decisis was a
common-law heuristic for cases of judicial uncertainty, 180 that
common-law decision-making has, as Strauss argues, “been central to the American legal system from the start,”181 and so on.
Whether any of these arguments are right is a historical matter;
but the fact that they’re offered is consistent with our conventional practice of demanding adherence to the Founders’ law.
If this analysis is right, then the same historical approach
ought to determine what kind of stare decisis we have. To overturn a precedent, is it enough that the precedent be “demonstrably erroneous,”182 or do we need “some special reason over
and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided”?183
Does a precedent bind other government actors in the exercise
of their own constitutional functions, or are they free to disagree? 184 Can Congress abrogate or alter stare decisis, or is it
177. See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 523 U.S. 767, 784 (1998).
178. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; see Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899–
900, vacated as moot on reh’g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
179. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
180. See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87
VA. L. REV. 1 (2001); cf. Sachs, supra note 110, at 1863–66 (describing this account).
181. David A. Strauss, Do We Have a Living Constitution?, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 973,
977 (2011).
182. Nelson, supra note 180, at 1.
183. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S 833, 864 (1992).
184. Compare, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution”), with Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706
(2003) (criticizing this view).
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wholly the domain of the judiciary? 185 We often look to the
Court to answer these questions, but that’s just regular stare
decisis in action; we still need an account of where the Court
should be getting the answers. If the Founders’ law answered
these questions in a particular way, then the same answers
govern today—unless something happened in between.
Again, this conclusion may seem contrary to most modern
originalism. But in one sense it’s hard to see why an originalist
should come out any differently. If the Founders’ law really did
make the Court the supreme expositor of the Constitution,
when did they lose that power? And if they weren’t given that
power under the law of the Founding, when did they get it,
and how? Before concluding that originalism automatically unsettles decades of precedent, we first have to take a view on
what our original law actually provides.
3.

Originalism as Exclusive Law

All this suggests that the Founders’ law, together with lawful
changes, is at least one part of our law today—that we accord it
some kind of prima facie validity. We might call that mild claim a
weak form of originalism, though one so watered-down as barely
to deserve the name.186 On this Article’s view, the best understanding of originalism is the far stronger position in the definition above: that no rule is valid unless it can be rooted in the
Founders’ law. The claim isn’t just that the Founders’ law (when
we can determine what it is) has priority over other law that’s developed independently. The claim is that there is no other law—
that no other legal rules are actually part of our legal system.187
This Article won’t present anything like a full defense of this
claim. To be complete, that defense would need a much more
detailed positivist theory—which social conventions determine
the law, who has to hold them, how we identify them, and so
on. Instead, this Article merely suggests, via armchair sociology, some reasons to find the claim plausible.
185. See generally John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent,
50 DUKE L.J. 503 (2000); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 165; Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential
Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000).
186. See Berman, supra note 35, at 10, 17–23.
187. Cf. Baude, supra note 1 (manuscript at 6, 10–12, 45–50) (contrasting “exclusive” and “inclusive” originalism with more moderate positions).
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More importantly, the goal of this Article isn’t really to convince you that we still adhere to the Founders’ law. In fact, if
you come away from reading it convinced that we don’t, then
it’ll have been a success. The goal is to show why this is the
right question to be asking, if we really want to know whether
(or to what extent) originalism is the law.
a.

Premises of Legal Argument

Our legal practices care about history. Whether a rule has the
right historical pedigree does a great deal to show that it’s part
of our law. Indeed, this is often where originalist arguments
derive their rhetorical force. In the oral arguments in Hollingsworth v. Perry, Justice Scalia repeatedly asked respondents’
counsel to identify when the law had changed on same-sex
marriage: “When do you think it became unconstitutional?”188
If we can’t say when things have changed, that makes it harder
to explain how they changed, which makes us less confident
that they’ve changed. We don’t always need a specific month or
year; counsel’s answer, that the issue turns on “when we . . . as
a culture determine[] that sexual orientation is a characteristic
of individuals that they cannot control,”189 is a claim of changing outcomes due to changing facts. But we do need a reason,
and this reason usually has a rough location in time. If we can’t
identify the time, then something seems wrong, and our argument seems to be more about law reform than law.
Many scholars who may not call themselves originalists recognize this feature of our practice. According to Lawrence Lessig, for example, when Americans confront the change in constitutional understandings before and after the New Deal, they
typically conclude either that the pre-New Deal understanding
was wrong, that the post-New Deal understanding is wrong, or
“that some political act sufficed to authorize this judicial transformation.”190 In other words, in the American legal system, it
matters how you got from there to here. This search for a historical pedigree only makes sense if we have reason to find one; that
is, if our legal rules are expected to be rooted in prior law.
188. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 39.
189. Id. at 40.
190. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
STAN. L. REV. 395, 400 (1995) (noting this response, but criticizing it as a false
choice).
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That requirement limits the kinds of legal arguments that we
accept. Consider, for example, the holding of Reynolds v. Sims, under which the Constitution requires state legislative districts to
have roughly equal numbers of people.191 Originalism, as this Article defines it, conceivably offers a number of ways to argue for
that conclusion. Maybe equal apportionment was part of U.S. law
at the Founding (a hard argument to win). Maybe it became part
of our law in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause was validly adopted.192 Maybe it became part of our
law at some later point, as the abstract requirement of equal protection was applied to changing facts, or when the population differences across districts became so stark as to trigger some latent
constitutional rule. Maybe it only became part of our law when
the Supreme Court decided Reynolds in 1964, under some theory
on which the Court has power to do things like that (and this
power itself has the right kind of historical pedigree, and so on).193
Or maybe the Court simply got it wrong in Reynolds or in the cases that it cited,194 but we’re now obliged to act as if those cases
were correct, under some doctrine of stare decisis that really is
part of our law. And so on.
On this Article’s view, all of those arguments are theoretically
possible, and only history can decide among them. But now consider what rejecting this view might entail. Suppose someone
wanted to argue for the Reynolds rule while systematically denying each of the claims above. Suppose they conceded that equal
apportionment was not the law at the Founding, that it was not
validly adopted in 1868, that it does not follow from applying
rules to changing facts, that the Court had not been authorized to
impose the rule on its own, that its decision does not deserve respect as a matter of stare decisis (or any other doctrine finding
its roots in the Founding era), and so on. They just think, notwithstanding all this, that Reynolds is still the law.

191. 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
192. This seems to have been the Court’s reasoning. See id. at 568.
193. For instance, a power to create implementing doctrines to enforce other
constitutional requirements, see, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and
the Two-Output Thesis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 220 (2006); see also AMAR, supra note
116, at 192–94, 223–30, 261 n.* (defending Reynolds as enforcing the Republican
Government Clause).
194. See 377 U.S. at 557–61 (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)).
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Whatever else you might say about that position, it isn’t
originalist. In fact, it’s the distillation of nonoriginalism: a claim
that something that has no roots in the Founders’ law is nonetheless our law today. More importantly, it’s very different
from the way we usually speak and argue in legal contexts—so
much so that it almost doesn’t sound like a legal argument.
Sure, there are plenty of arguments out there for the Reynolds
rule, whether based on political theory,195 pure morality, prudence, or something else; sometimes lawyers make such arguments and win. But at the same time, everyone recognizes that
what the law is and what it ought to be are different things—
and the same goes for what lawyers say and what they ought
to say. Lawyers often win cases by playing on our prejudices,
and yet we don’t call those sources of law.196
A nonoriginalist claim like this might still be true as a positivist matter. No legal system can insulate itself from social facts.
But at any given time, the law imposes some rules of change,
over and above the tautological surrender of “the law is whatever it is.” And it’s plausible to think that the higher-order
principles we currently accept, the ones that do the important
work in defining the content of our law, require some kind of
reference to the Founding.
If this is right, then we can understand why original-law
originalism would claim to be exclusive—rather than just taking priority over other sources that might operate in cases of
ambiguity or uncertainty. Lots of things in today’s law are uncertain, and yesterday’s law was no different. Even if we were
sure about the Founders’ substantive law, we might still be unsure about their rules of change, the historical events that
might have occasioned changes, how much change those historical events produced, or how the new rules (thus modified)
should apply to current facts. As it happens, we have plenty of
legal techniques for reducing uncertainty, which can be applied
here too.197 But even irreducible uncertainty doesn’t always give
195. Cf. id. at 565 (“Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded on representative
government, it would seem reasonable that a majority of the people of a State
could elect a majority of that State’s legislators.”).
196. See Sachs, supra note 1, at 2266.
197. E.g., closure rules such as “everything not forbidden is permitted” or “the
plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion.” The Ninth and Tenth Amendments
arguably serve as closure rules like this; every constitutional power is either
granted or reserved. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth
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us a permission slip to bring in new sources of law; often it just
leaves us uncertain. A statute punishing “neglect” of a child
might be irreducibly vague in many situations;198 a judge trying
to apply it might feel utterly at sea; but a judge who started
applying Japanese law in its place, on the claim that American
law had simply run out, would be acting without authority.
Whatever is used to fill those gaps—even the judge’s own discretion—needs its own legal justification under the rules of our
legal system. And that justification, if the above argument is
right, has to be rooted in the Founders’ law.
b.

Addressing the Alternatives

Whether we adhere to the Founders’ law isn’t a question we
can answer in isolation. What we really want to know is
whether this account of our law is better than its competitors.
Maybe we mostly adhere to the Founders’ law, but also accept a
few unauthorized changes that came after, such as during Reconstruction or the New Deal. Or maybe we don’t adhere to the
law of any particular time; maybe we just have commitments to
individual sources of law, without worrying about when those
sources emerged.
i.

Multiple Foundings

One way of rejecting the Founders’ law is to accept particular
changes that their law didn’t authorize. On one retelling of Bruce
Ackerman’s theory, for example, the United States has had a series of legal regimes, like the numbered French Republics. Each
regime started with an unauthorized change, a “constitutional
moment” in which the sovereign people altered their law.
Ackerman claims, for example, that the Fourteenth Amendment
wasn’t validly adopted under Article V;199 as we’ve accepted it
Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 895 (2008). On originalism and uncertainty generally,
see Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551 (2012); Gary Lawson, Proving
the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859 (1992).
198. See Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 14, 24–28.
199. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 36, at 99–119. But see AMAR,
supra note 108, at 364–80; John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction
Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375 (2001); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE
L.J. 677, 709–12 (1993); Christopher R. Green, Loyal Denominatorism and the North-
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anyway, this shows that we don’t take the Founders’ law as a criterion for our own. Instead, each new moment (Reconstruction,
the New Deal, the Civil Rights Era) has served as a new miniFounding, requiring ironclad adherence to the law of the current
regime but not necessarily to anything further back.200
What should we make of this account? Ackerman’s moments
were clearly watersheds in American history. But as a positive
matter, looking to the higher-order legal principles that we
commonly accept and defend, we don’t really regard them as
remaking our law, or as marking the start of Second, Third, and
Fourth Republics. To the armchair sociologist, it seems like most
people—not just ordinary people, but also lawyers and officials—categorize these events as lawful changes within a continuing legal system. Indeed, Ackerman recognizes as much,
worrying that “[a]lmost everybody” mistakenly “assum[es] that
the formal text contains the complete constitutional canon.”201
Maybe Americans only feel this way because they’re ignorant of any historical controversy.202 But maybe it’s also because
our dominant legal explanations of these events, consistent
with the explanations given at the time, are based on continuity
rather than disruption. The authors of the Federalist were willing, with a little hemming and hawing, to admit that the Articles were being violated and to defend the violation as justi-

ern Authored Fourteenth Amendment: Reconstruction History (Aug. 28, 2013), http://
ssrn.com/id=2317471 [http://perma.cc/V6TZ-GHRG].
200. See ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 36, at 218 (describing
the 1968 elections as popular ratification of constitutional change); id. at 317 (arguing that judges “do not have the constitutional authority to erase the considered
judgments of We the People” (emphasis omitted)); ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 36, at 409; 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 139 (1991) (describing a judge’s duty as “preserv[ing] the achievements of
popular sovereignty during the long periods of our public existence when the
citizenry is not mobilized for great constitutional achievements”).
201. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1754–55
(2007); accord ACKERMAN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 36, at 32–33.
202. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Rules of Recognition, Constitutional
Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law on Acceptance, in THE RULE OF
RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 55, at 175, 186–87 (suggesting that Americans assume “that the Supreme Court Justices and other officials
are adhering in good faith to the rules of the game, whatever those rules might
be,” and rely on “other bodies—the legal profession, elected officials, the press,
and so on—to inform them of any constitutional coup d’état”).
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fied. 203 By contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment’s proponents
had detailed and well-grounded legal theories as to why the
ratification process was proper under existing rules. 204 The
New Dealers didn’t claim to be replacing the original understanding with something better, but vindicating the Constitution from the mistaken readings of the conservative Court.205
And the Warren Court’s desegregation decisions have long
been defended as vindicating the actual Fourteenth Amendment from the errors of Plessy v. Ferguson.206 The official story of
American law, in other words, rejects the idea of more than one
Founding. The fact that this is the official story, the one from
which other legal conclusions are usually derived, makes it
strong evidence of what our law actually requires.207
Looking beyond the official stories, we can also see these conventions reflected in the attitudes of lawyers and academics. For
example, there remains a lingering discomfort, and a fair deal of
scholarship, around any suggestions that the Fourteenth
Amendment,208 the New Deal,209 or the Civil Rights Era210 departed from prior rules. These kinds of worries may be unnecessary,
but they’re almost entirely absent when it comes to, say, our de203. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 94, at 279 (noting that “institutions must be sacrificed” to “the safety and happiness of society,” based on “the
absolute necessity of the case”—and adding only as an afterthought that “PERHAPS” the states’ previous breaches of the Articles had rendered the treaty void).
204. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 108, at 364–80; Harrison, supra note 199; Green,
supra note 199.
205. See, e.g., Franklin Delano Roosevelt, A “Fireside Chat” Discussing the Plan for
Reorganization of the Judiciary (Mar. 9, 1937), in PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES,
supra note 129, at 122, 126 (criticizing the Court for “amend[ing] the Constitution
by the arbitrary exercise of judicial power—by judicial say-so,” and calling for it
to uphold New Deal measures by “enforc[ing] the Constitution as written”).
206. 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 422–24 (1960).
207. See supra notes 65–75 and accompanying text.
208. Compare, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 199, at 99–119, with AMAR, supra note 108,
at 364–80; Harrison, supra note 199, Paulsen, supra note 199, and Green, supra note 199.
209. Compare, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010), with Randy
E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of “Commerce,” 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 623.
210. Compare, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Response, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995), with
Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457 (1996), Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995), and David R. Upham, Interracial
Marriage and the Original Understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 42
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (2015).
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partures from British law or from the Articles of Confederation.
And most importantly, if you go into court in a constitutional case
and say, “well, Judge, the original Constitution is against us, but
we superseded it through an informal amendment in 1937,” you
will lose. That’s an important feature of the American legal system,
and no serious analysis of our legal practices should ignore it.
ii.

Multiple Sources

Not every legal system incorporates the law of a particular
time. Some people reject originalism, not because they prefer
some later date to the Founding, but because they don’t see our
legal rules as depending on any date at all. As a matter of social
fact, we might have assorted commitments to various sources of
law, without any special regard to when or how those commitments emerged.211 (To borrow a distinction from Robert Nozick,
these might be called “end-state principles” of law, as opposed to
“historical principles” that focus on how each rule came to be.)212
As an example of this kind of source-based theory, suppose
that U.K. law really did undergo an unauthorized change in
1966, when the House of Lords claimed a power to overrule
precedent.213 Maybe, in actual fact, all the changes since then
have been authorized changes—so that U.K. law today really is
what it was in 1966, plus lawful changes. But calling the British
“1966-originalists” would be misleading if no one there cares,
as a general matter, about 1966 in particular. What U.K. law
does care about are particular sources of law (statutes, constitutional conventions, common law, etc.), the particular way they
are right now, which might by happenstance line up with the
way they were in 1966.
In the same way, maybe American law relies on certain
sources (text, precedent, tradition, and so on), the way we accept
them now, without caring whether they came from the Founding or took shape later on. This kind of theory doesn’t have to be
nonoriginalist; by coincidence, it might list precisely the same
sources of law that the Founders recognized. But it’s particularly
well suited to nonoriginalism, because nonoriginalist theories
are more plausible if they’re based on a series of familiar sources
211. See, e.g., Berman & Toh, supra note 38, at 1751, 1754–55.
212. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE & UTOPIA 155 (2d ed. 2013).
213. See Raz, supra note 76, at 11 n.22.
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than on arbitrary commitments to dates like 1966. Maybe we
treat the Constitution (or longstanding tradition, or stare decisis)
in a certain way, and we’re more committed to having it our
way than to whatever the Founders did.
This is an empirical debate about complex social facts. If we
accept, all the way down, sources of law that aren’t rooted in the
Founding, then that’d be a real blow against originalism, at least
in the form that this Article presents it. But it’s not clear that we
do accept any doctrines like that, at least not all the way down.
Consider the way in which we accept the Constitution itself.
As nonoriginalists have correctly pointed out, it’s possible to accept a constitutional text in different ways. We could, if we
chose, use it “as a focal point for legal coordination . . . ; as a flexible framework for common law elaboration; as a locus of normative discourse in a flourishing constitutional culture; or as one
of many legitimate ingredients in a pluralist practice of constitutional adjudication.”214 Someone taking one of these views can
still venerate the text, or share Jack Balkin’s intention to “be
faithful to the written Constitution as law” and to “accept it as
our framework for governance”;215 they’d just treat these laws
and frameworks differently.216
The originalist response isn’t that these things are impossible
or absurd (they aren’t), but rather that they’re not what we
conventionally do. Our standard way of relying on the Constitution’s text is as a binding enactment, not as a locus of discourse; we take as our own the legal rules it established until
those rules are lawfully changed. More importantly, one official reason we do this is that it’s what we understand the Constitution to have been designed for: To quote the celebrated line
from Marbury, “[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, and
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”217 It’s because the Constitution
was adopted as law, and not just as a set of guidelines or inspiring phrases, that we retain it as law today.
That’s also why, in our practices, those who invoke external
sources like precedent and tradition typically stress their Found214. Coan, supra note 48, at 1047.
215. BALKIN, supra note 122, at 38.
216. See Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2040–
43 (2012).
217. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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ing-era roots. If all we really cared about were “contemporary
practices of acceptance,”218 in Fallon’s words, then the Court in
Noel Canning would have had no reason to waste ink on Founding-era theories of liquidation;219 nor would scholars of stare decisis spend time discussing whether the doctrine was “a central,
widely accepted feature of our constitutional practice almost
from the beginning,” 220 whether “founding-era commentators
generally presupposed that constitutional precedents would be
treated as authoritative,”221 and so on. But these things do matter, because our legal rules need good chains of title. If we found
out tomorrow that stare decisis didn’t exist at the Founding, and
that it had been invented out of whole cloth by Chief Justice
Burger,222 that’d surely be concerning to many American lawyers and academics—in a way that the 1966 practice statement’s
origins might not matter to British legal culture.
It’s also important to recognize why a conflict between our
history and our familiar sources would actually be a conflict in
the first place. Depending on the history, originalism might
produce some conclusions that are simply too outlandish for
the American people to accept. In theory, whether West Virginia is unconstitutional ultimately comes down to whether the
Constitution permitted Virginia to be divided in two, which in
turn depends on the relevance of a particular semicolon in Article IV.223 Maybe it’s true, as a prediction about American society, that we’d never get rid of West Virginia—even in the face
of a knock-down historical argument about semicolons. Instead, we’d search very hard for a domesticating doctrine that
let us keep the state around; and, if all else failed, we’d ignore
the semicolon and preserve the arrangements we’re used to.
But the reason why there’s any conflict here, the reason why
218. Fallon, supra note 38, at 1117.
219. See text accompanying note 147.
220. Fallon, supra note 38, at 1129.
221. Id. at 1129 n.81.
222. Cf. Sachs, supra note 1, at 2281 (discussing a similar hypothetical).
223. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or
more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the
States concerned as well as of the Congress.”); Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S.
39 (1870) (upholding the state’s existence); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 291 (2002).
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we’d even need to think about workarounds, is that we already
and intuitively accept the original rule (whatever it was) as valid for us—which is why we might need to alter it to avoid an
unpleasant consequence. And even if we would depart from the
Founders’ law if push really came to shove, the fact remains
that we haven’t done so yet. Our higher-order commitments are
still tied to the Founding; we haven’t given up on the Founders’ law, even in favor of our familiar legal sources.
This account of our current law, as reflected in familiar legal
practices, may or may not sound convincing to you. If it’s
wrong, then it’s wrong, and our system isn’t fully originalist.
But even so, our law might still be almost-all-originalist, or
mostly-originalist, and our dependence on the Founders’ law
will help show how much and why. Again, the goal of this Article isn’t to prove, once and for all, that our law is originalist.
Rather, it’s to suggest that our law may well be originalist if—
and precisely to the extent that—we take as our own the Founders’ law, as it’s been lawfully changed.
III.

ORIGINAL-LAW ORIGINALISM

This Article presents a version of originalism—adherence to
the Founders’ law—that’s plausibly true as a description of our
law. One significant side benefit of this version, though, is that
it may be appealing to those who already consider themselves
originalists. By moving the focus from interpretation to legal
change, it helps explain some common originalist intuitions,
and it may help resolve some of originalism’s intractable intramural debates.
On this theory, our law today is the Founders’ law, as lawfully
changed. If that’s right, then the legal rules that the Constitution
establishes today are the ones it established at the Founding,
plus any lawful changes. What we’re looking for from the Constitution isn’t really what its text originally said, on our favorite
theory of interpretation, but what its enactment originally did, as
a matter of Founding-era law. And to the extent that this legal
effect depended on what the text meant at the time, then that
search may well direct us to the text’s original meaning.
Preserving meaning to preserve the law is a standard move
among originalists. But a commitment to the Founders’ law has
much broader implications. Every legal system that uses written
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texts has some legal rules—let’s call them “interpretive rules”—
for converting those texts into law.224 If we want to know what
law was established when the original Constitution was adopted, then we’ll need to use the interpretive rules that were used at
the time, the ones that were part of the Founders’ law. And we’ll
need to do the same for each amendment, accounting for any
lawful changes to the interpretive rules that might have occurred to date. The rules in force at any of these times might
have been very different from the ones that modern originalists
support today, or they might not. This is a historical question,
not one that can be answered with pure theory.
As a result, this “original-law originalism”—a variant on
what’s known as “original methods originalism”225—offers resources for recasting, and hopefully resolving, some of the
longstanding debates among originalists. There are many
schools of originalists, each emphasizing a different feature of
texts: authors’ intentions, expected applications, public meaning, and so on. To the extent that they’re making legal claims,
rather than just normative or conceptual ones, what the different schools ought to agree about is contemporary law: the current authority of the Founders’ law, the thing that sets them
apart from the nonoriginalists. By contrast, what originalists
ought to disagree about is history: which interpretive rules
were included in the Founders’ law and which (if any) have
been added since. Those historical questions might be very difficult, but at least they provide a real subject for disagreement,
and one on which we might eventually make some progress.
A.

Original Law and Original Meaning

Suppose that American law today is whatever it was at the
Founding, plus lawful changes. Some of that Founding-era law
was the product of the Constitution of 1788, which added a
number of important rules to the American legal system. Those
rules remain law today, except as they’ve been lawfully
changed. So the legal content of the original Constitution today—its contribution to the corpus juris, the difference it
makes to the general stock of American legal rules—is still the
224. See generally Nelson, supra note 142.
225. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 8, at 116–38; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and
the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009).
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contribution it made at the Founding, plus lawful changes
since then. And to the extent that this original contribution depended on the original meaning of the text, preserving the law
will usually involve preserving that meaning too.
To illustrate, imagine that Article I gave Congress power “to
regulate the growing of corn.” And assume that in eighteenthcentury America, “corn” was a general term for all cereals (think
of Britain’s “Corn Laws”), not just maize. Anyone trying to establish the Founding-era content of U.S. law would conclude, absent
some special reason not to, that the First Congress had power to
regulate cereals like wheat and barley. Denying that power to the
114th Congress today, just because our linguistic practices regarding “corn” have changed over time, would be a change to our legal rules. And if we want to preserve the Founders’ legal rules,
we’ll ordinarily need to preserve the meaning of their language.
This is an intuitive feature of originalism, and one that many
other scholars have recognized.226 As Marbury asked, “To what
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be
passed by those intended to be restrained?” 227 Preserving the
limits is the important part; the writing is there only to help ensure that the limits aren’t “mistaken, or forgotten,” over time.228
But relatively few scholars have considered the full implications
of this approach—preferring to support their interpretive theories
on normative or conceptual grounds. As noted above, what the
law is and what it ought to be are different; whatever might be the
normatively best or philosophically correct way of doing things, a
legal system might, as a matter of social fact, have a practice of
doing something else. The intuition behind original-law originalism is that the law may have taken a position on which interpretive rules apply—and, if it did, those rules ought to control.
226 . See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 427, 429–30 (arguing that it’s important “to preserve meaning
over time” because the “law continues in force over time until it is amended or
repealed,” unless there’s a “conscious act of lawmaking” in between); accord. e.g.,
BALKIN, supra note 122, at 36–37; Randy E. Barnett, Welcome to the New Originalism:
A Comment on Jack Balkin’s Living Originalism, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 42,
46 (2013); Goldsworthy, supra note 34, at 42; Grégoire C.N. Webber, Originalism’s
Constitution, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 147, 151; Whittington, supra note 5, at 73–74.
227. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
228. Id.
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Interpretation and Legal Rules

The idea of legal rules that govern interpretation may sound
strange at first. Don’t we just figure out the right way to read a
legal text, and then do whatever it says? The problem is that
what an enactment says (its communicative content) and what
it legally obliges us to do (its legal content) aren’t really the
same thing. There’s a great deal to be said on this topic,229 but a
brief discussion should suffice.
When we talk about the “meaning” of a legal instrument (a
contract, will, statute, etc.), we’re often referring instead to its legal content: the particular assignment of rights, liabilities, responsibilities, and so on, that it endorses or makes part of the law.230
As Raz notes, legal instruments needn’t be written in these
Hohfeldian terms.231 We just need to be able to understand, after
some analysis, the rules that they endorse.232 (Think of the complex legal implications of a will reading, “All to wife.”233)
Often this analysis depends on other legal rules. As Endicott
writes, “the law itself has techniques for determining the effect
of [a] normative text.”234 Standard examples include the Dictionary Act, the repeal-revival rule, or the general savings statute.235 People might disagree about the role of these statutes in
our legal system,236 but it’s surely possible for a legal system to
have legal rules that determine the effect of texts. Consider the
familiar canon that the specific controls the general.237 The only
role of this canon is to change the outcome in cases that already
229. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479 (2014); see also William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The
Law of Interpretation (work in progress).
230. See Raz, supra note 76, at 29 n.41.
231. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (providing a taxonomy of
legal rights).
232. Id.
233. See Diane J. Klein, How To Do Things with Wills, 32 WHITTIER L. REV. 455,
462 n.42 (2011) (describing the world’s shortest will).
234. Endicott, supra note 198, at 15.
235. 1 U.S.C. §§ 1, 108, 109 (2012).
236. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97 (2003)
(arguing that such statutes cannot bind on future Congresses).
237. See, e.g., Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–51 (1974); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 186 (2012).
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fall within the meaning of a newer, more general statute. For
instance, Title VII gives a cause of action to anyone who meets
certain criteria, but a person meeting all those criteria can still
be barred from suit by a 200-year-old statute about claim preclusion.238 The problem here isn’t that the plaintiff falls outside
the meaning of Title VII; he doesn’t, or else he’d have lost on
some other ground already. The problem is that he falls inside
the meaning of some other statute too, and we need a legal
rule—not just knowledge of the meaning of texts—to tell us
what to do when the two conflict.
If we’re interested in the Constitution’s original legal content,
and not just its original meaning, then we have to determine
that content by processing the text through whatever legal
rules were operative at the time. By way of analogy, consider
what happens when we create a legal text today. As a text, as
marks on paper, it could have a variety of meanings; we could
read it as a proposal, parody, or prose poem, as a statement of
our civic identity or a personal source of inspiration, and so
on. 239 But when determining its legal content—the change it
works in the law, its contribution to the general stock of American legal rules—we look to our legal rules of interpretation,
our process of taking texts and turning them into law.
Those rules might take any of a number of strategies. They
might incorporate by reference the best philosophical theory of
meaning and leave it at that. They might incorporate the linguistic conventions of English, or legalese, or medieval law
French. They might incorporate the nonlegal customs of officials, things that are useful guides to official practice but that
we don’t regard as part of the law. (Such as writing exclusive
lists, a custom that justifies a presumption of expressio unius but
that doesn’t carry the force of law.) Or they might include specifically legal rules, such as governing statutes, specific common-law doctrines,240 or unwritten interpretive principles (such

238. See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 470–72, 476 (1982) (applying Title VII as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1738).
239. See Sachs, supra note 110, at 1825–28.
240. See Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes
and Unwritten Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2013); Sachs, supra note 110.
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as the relative authority of text and purpose241 or the validity of
liquidating meaning over time242).
The idea of determining an enactment’s legal effect by “rules”
might suggest too neat a picture. This Article uses “rule” in a
very broad sense,243 and it’s silly to think that American law ever
offered—at the Founding or today—an off-the-shelf algorithm
for mechanically converting language into law. But there are still
better and worse ways to get legal content out of particular written instruments. Delegates at Philadelphia got into plenty of
fights, and lobbyists today spend plenty of money, to influence
the language of legal instruments; that’d all be pointless without
some reliable means of converting those texts into legal rules.
The point here is merely that whatever methods are prescribed
in the law, those are the ones we are supposed to use. Failing to
use them would be a legal error, and it might produce mistaken
judgments about what an enactment does to the law.
One easy way to use the wrong rules is to pick them from the
wrong time period. If we want to know how a new enactment
affects today’s law, we have to consult today’s interpretive rules.
If we want to know how the enactment of the Constitution’s text
affected the law at the Founding, we have to consult the interpretive rules that were around back then. Using anachronistic
rules designed for modern enactments would mislead us as to
the state of the law at the time, just like using anachronistic rules
of language to read the word “corn.” And if we want to know
what, say, the Sixteenth Amendment did to the law, we need to
consult the interpretive rules that were around when it was
adopted in 1913—including the external standards, like the English usage of the time, that those interpretive rules may have incorporated by reference. We look to the original interpretive
rules, because those are what generated the original law.
2.

The Substance of Interpretive Rules

Original-law originalism is all about procedure, not substance. On its own, the theory doesn’t say anything about what

241. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349,
371–72 (1992).
242. See Sachs, supra note 110, at 1806–08; supra note 142 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 18.
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the content of the original interpretive rules might have been.
That’s an empirical question; we have to look and see.
Once we’ve done our historical inquiries, the answers might
well surprise us. Maybe the Founders really did choose “language capable of growth,”244 or the Constitution’s legal content
really was supposed to evolve along with changes in our language (giving “corn” a new meaning in every new era). Many
ostensible nonoriginalists—including, for instance, Justice Breyer—base their claims about legal sources or interpretive methods
on Founding-era evidence.245 To the extent that they accept that
history controls, but think that it points in a different direction
than modern originalists do, we have an ordinary historical disagreement, which we ought to solve on empirical grounds.
Originalists should be happy to fight on those grounds and to
welcome such claims into the “originalist” tent. Again, if someone’s basis for taking a “nonoriginalist” view (that America has
a common-law constitution, 246 that we experience occasional
moments of higher lawmaking, 247 that a variety of traditional
sources and interpretive approaches should apply248) is that so it
was laid down in 1788, why shouldn’t we call these views
“originalist” instead? Everything still depends on the history: If
it turns out that the Founders didn’t have a common-law constitution, or didn’t choose language capable of growth, and so on,
then these views would have to be revised.
Currently, when people describe the commitments necessary to
be an originalist, they often make unstated assumptions about the
history. On Lawrence Solum’s famous formulation of originalism,
with which “most or almost all originalists agree,” the original
meaning of a constitutional provision “was fixed or determined at
the time” it was adopted (the “fixation thesis”),249 and this original
244. Bickel, supra note 134, at 63.
245. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 151, at 33.
246. See generally STRAUSS, supra note 38.
247. See generally ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 36.
248. See generally Powell, supra note 45; H. Jefferson Powell, Further Reflections on
Not Being “Not an Originalist,” 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 288, 292 (2010) (describing
pluralistic interpretive practice as “in fact what constitutional law has been, as a
descriptive matter, since Americans first began dealing with the existence of written constitutions”).
249. Solum, supra note 4, at 33 (emphasis omitted); see also Lawrence B. Solum,
The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/id=2559701 [http://perma.cc/2YVD-9VDH].
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meaning “should make a substantial contribution to the content of
constitutional doctrine” (the “contribution thesis”).250 To an original-law originalist, these claims are contingent, not essential to the
project. If the Founders’ interpretive rules did require the law to
update along with every change in language, then it’s just not true
that the original meaning of the original Constitution has any substantial contribution to make.
Of course, while some academics approve that kind of updating,251 it’s doubtful that any actual society ever has. Changes
in language usually happen for reasons having nothing to do
with the law (e.g., “corn”), and they might upset all the reasons
the enactors had for choosing some words over others. In particular, there’s little evidence that the Founders’ law functioned
this way. Madison, for example, dismissed the idea outright:
If the meaning of the text be sought in the changeable meaning of the words composing it, it is evident that the shape
and attributes of the government must partake of the changes to which the words and phrases of all living languages
are constantly subject. What a metamorphosis would be
produced in the code of law if all its ancient phraseology
were to be taken in its modern sense!252

3.

What Originalists Can Disagree About

At this point, we can see the way to common ground for
originalists of different schools. Originalists can agree—or
ought to—that we adhere to the Founders’ law, as lawfully
changed. What they might disagree about is the historical content of that law (including its interpretive rules) or how we’ve
changed it since.
In fact, each school might benefit from recasting its arguments
in terms of the original law. Original-intentions scholars have
already started doing this, arguing that if we endow a particular
group with authority to make law for us (Framers, Ratifiers,
etc.), we should look for the law that they wanted to make.253 If
the Constitution trumps all other sources of law, why let interpretive rules trump the people who get to write the Constitution,
250. Solum, supra note 4, at 35 (emphasis omitted).
251. See sources cited supra note 46.
252. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 3 LETTERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 441, 442 (Phila., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1867).
253. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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and so to make any rules they want? The reason, on the originallaw approach, is that the Framers or Ratifiers might not have
had this kind of untrammeled authority at the Founding. Maybe
their commission wasn’t to make the law so much as to produce a
text, which would then be turned into law through the existing
interpretive rules. (One reason for this kind of limited commission is that we can’t read their minds to find out the law they
made;254 we can only read their texts, and so we might need interpretive rules to help us along.) Either way, we need to know
the answer to this question of authority before we can say
whether the authors’ intentions always control.
A similar approach applies to “public meaning” originalists,
who emphasize what an actual member of the public255—or,
perhaps, a “reasonable person” of that place and time 256 —
would have thought the document meant. If the relevant reader is already familiar with the entire corpus juris, including all
applicable interpretive rules, then “public meaning” may just
collapse into original law. If not, then presumably we have
some reason for depriving them of that knowledge—for instance, a view that “[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters.”257 But that too is a claim about Foundingera interpretive rules, one that might be true or false and that
remains hotly debated.258 If the law at the Founding attributed
a different legal content to the Constitution than what the ordinary voter understood (say, the understandings of the delegates they elected), that might pose a problem of democratic
theory or legitimacy, but not a problem of law.
Of all the popular interpretive methods, the original-law approach most closely resembles what’s known as “original methods” originalism,259 which generally tries to use the interpretive
methods that would have been used by the Founders. In fact,
perhaps the only real difference between the two is how they
254. Cf. Alexander, Telepathic Law, supra note 9 (discussing such a hypothetical).
255. Cf. Smith, supra note 11, at 225 (describing this view).
256. See generally Lawson & Seidman, supra note 34.
257. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
258. See, e.g., Mike Rappaport, Justice Scalia, Ordinary Meanings, and Legal Meanings, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2014/
08/22/justice-scalia-ordinary-meanings-and-legal-meanings/ [http://perma.cc/VA6VMCC8] (describing the ongoing debate among originalists).
259. See sources cited supra note 225.
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decide which Founders’ methods to follow. For example, suppose that the lay reader of the Constitution would have used
method A, but a technically educated elite reader would have
used method B. 260 Different versions of “original methods”
might use different means to choose among them. On an original-law approach, though, this would be a question for jurisprudence to answer: Does the best positivist theory identify law
through the conventions of ordinary people, or through the
practices of lawyers, judges, and officials? Whose rules actually
constituted the law of the Republic? To the extent that we want
to use this text as a ground for legal conclusions today, we need
to start by determining its role in the Founders’ law.
B.

Addressing Objections

To the uninitiated, all this might sound like splitting hairs—or
worse, like angels dancing on the head of a pin. An original-law
approach assumes that the Founders had a full set of interpretive
rules ready to go, and that these rules were part of American law,
not just the laws of individual states.261 But given how much people disagreed back then, was there really any law to apply?262 And
if we’re not sure about the interpretive rules, and if the theory is
such a big tent, won’t its flexibility and theoretical abstraction take
away the predictability and constraint that originalism promised
to deliver? These objections are important, but ultimately not effective. There was law to apply at the Founding, and this law itself
provides the only kind of constraint we need.
1.

Was There Any Law?

The Founding was a time of extraordinary ferment, when
Americans were deeply divided on first principles of law and
politics. In particular, they disagreed about how to interpret the

260. Cf. Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 323 (2011) (describing Founding-era divisions between lay and elite
understandings of the Constitution).
261. See supra note 108.
262. Cf. Cornell, supra note 260 (describing the variety of Founding-era interpretive approaches); Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 912 (2008) (arguing that “there was no more agreement
about what the ‘correct’ way to interpret the Constitution was or should be in the
early years of the Republic than there is today”).
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Constitution.263 Was this new document more like a statute, a
state constitution, or a treaty that binds sovereign states?
Should it be construed broadly to achieve its objects, or strictly
to protect the contracting parties? We, today, shouldn’t be surprised by this kind of disagreement—nor should we expect
people back then to have agreed any more than we do.264
But that disagreement doesn’t leave us at sea. For one thing,
if we still adhere to the Founders’ law, their disagreements are
the ones that matter. If some questions were well settled at the
time and only became confusing later on (say, due to obscuring
changes in language), recovering original history can help
solve questions rather than raise them.
For another, disagreement is just the start of an inquiry, not
the end. When we disagree on legal questions, we don’t always
conclude that they lack a right answer; we each have opinions
on which answers make the most sense to us, and we usually
manage to muddle through. The same may be true of the
Founding. The evidence cited by Jefferson Powell, for example,
suggests that early interpretive practice was dominated by
common-law methods of statutory interpretation, and that the
treaty analogy gained particular prominence only after the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.265 If that’s right, then we may
be able to resolve a number of interpretive questions well
enough, even if the Founders lacked an absolute consensus.
Maybe evidence of radical and thoroughgoing disagreement
at the Founding, of the kind that wholly undermines the social
conventions giving rise to legal rules, would make the originallaw project impossible. Law is a matter of social fact, and some
societies simply lack the features necessary to generate legal answers at a given time. (When, during the Revolution, did British
law really lose force on the ground?) But however chaotic the
Founding was, there wasn’t that much disagreement. Even before the Constitution’s adoption, the United States of America
was an independent confederated state, with a functioning government, officials, and courts. The Confederation might have
functioned poorly, given the Articles’ many defects; but it existed, and it both generated and was governed by legal rules. It’s
263. See generally Nelson, supra note 240; Powell, supra note 142.
264. See Smith, supra note 11, at 228.
265. See Powell, supra note 142.
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hard to say the disagreements at the Founding were so fundamental as to eliminate the possibility of operative law.
In the same way, the existence of the United States as a real
live government before the Constitution suggests that there
were some interpretive rules around too. After all, the legal
system had to have some means of interpreting enactments like
the Articles or the various ordinances of the Confederation
Congress. The thirteen states all shared the English commonlaw tradition, and they all relied on common-law principles as
the natural background against which to read Congress’s enactments. Indeed, the very fact that people argued over which
interpretive model to use—statutes, treaties, contracts, etc.—
shows that they assumed some degree of consensus as to the
rules that would properly govern in each case.
2.

The Founders’ Law and Constraint

A practicing lawyer, reading about the disputing schools of
originalism, might be forgiven for wondering what relevance all
this could have to the law. The first modern originalists were
easy to understand: They wanted to constrain judges, in reaction
to what they saw as a wild-and-crazy Warren Court. 266 Since
then, constraint has become less important to “new originalism,”
but it still plays a role in common intuitions about originalist
theory.267 Original-law originalism, though, seems to blow constraint out of the water. History aside, the theory is potentially
compatible with a bizarre variety of methods, from Bork to
Breyer to Strauss. If we have to go through all this complicated
theoretical apparatus, and we still don’t know the answers when
we’re done, what good is it to originalism?
Part of the answer turns on the difference between theory and
practice. 268 A practicing lawyer, reading about the disputing
schools of originalists, might feel like a short-order cook being
lectured about organic chemistry: “Sure, at some level this might
help explain what I do, but hopefully not very often.” On most
ordinary questions, the range of plausible theories about our

266. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 10, at 7; Rehnquist, supra note 10.
267. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 11; see also Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the
New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713 (2011).
268 . See generally William Baude, Impure Originalism (July 26, 2013) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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law—including the Founders’ law—will be relatively narrow, in
which case the theory won’t do much harm to constraint.
Where it does make a difference, though, the theory may
provide a better kind of constraint than the early modern
originalists had in mind. One longstanding problem with “constraint”—as others have pointed out before—is that it can be
achieved in many different ways, most of which look nothing
at all like originalism. Any number of procedures can restrict
judges’ decisions: flip a coin, always rule for the defendant, always follow your party’s political preferences,269 always follow
the original meaning of the French Constitution (or the U.S.
Constitution with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments removed), and so on. If the only goal is to produce determinate
results, there’s no reason to pick originalism in particular. And
the Constitution’s original meaning might itself license judicial
discretion—or, even worse, the sheer difficulty of recovering its
meaning may let judges call any result “originalist.”270
But a focus on the Founders’ law helps explain the intuitive
connection between originalism and constraint. The problem
with coin-flipping or the French Constitution isn’t that they
impose few constraints on judges; they might be rather demanding in practice. The problem is that the choice of constraint
is so unconstrained. We have no good explanation, from the
perspective of constraint alone, why judges should follow the
Constitution’s original meaning as opposed to any other set of
equally determinate rules, so long as all of them use the same
ones. Adherence to the Founders’ law provides that explanation, because the source of constraint is the law, whatever that
might be.
Judges, like all government officials, have to act according to
law. Sometimes the law provides determinate rules, sometimes
flexible standards (like “neglect”); each has its own costs and
benefits, and we use them each in different ways.271 If the law
happens to give the judges plenty of room to play fast-andloose, that’s our fault, not the judge’s fault. Following the law is
what judges are supposed to do.

269. Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy, supra note 197, at 1554.
270. See Redish & Arnould, supra note 46 (making this argument).
271. See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 155.
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Original-law originalism imposes few substantive requirements on the law; it leaves a great deal up to history. Perhaps, as
a policy matter, it’d allow judges to get away with too much.272
But the method stands or falls, not by whether it limits judicial
creativity, but whether it’s an accurate statement of our law.
And, in some ways, that’s the most important constraint of all.
IV.

ORIGINALISM AND HISTORY

Original-law originalism is extremely demanding from a historical perspective. There’s an awful lot we need to know. At
the same time, though, it suggests new ways of resolving ongoing debates between historians and lawyers.
One of the common complaints about originalism is that it
forces lawyers and judges to “play historian,” to learn a great
deal about matters (the Founders’ beliefs, political experience,
or linguistic practice) in which they lack real expertise. This is
perfectly fair, as far as it goes. Originalism requires a great deal
of historical knowledge, and the research producing that
knowledge ought to be done well.
But if originalism is really based on the Founders’ law, rather
than the meaning of a particular eighteenth-century text, then
the lawyers aren’t really treading on anyone’s turf. Instead,
they’re doing something eminently legal: determining what
U.S. law was as of a particular date. That’s obviously a job for
lawyers, albeit with the benefit of historians’ help.273
Moreover, it’s the kind of job that lawyers perform all the time.
Nemo dat might require us to figure out whether A or B owned
Blackacre long ago.274 State border disputes can turn on the proper
construction of an old interstate compact or the Crown grant to
Lord Baltimore.275 Ex post facto claims force courts to determine
what the law was when a crime was committed, not what it is today.276 And so on. We have domesticating doctrines like adverse
possession to help us avoid difficult inquiries into the past; but we
272. See Redish & Arnould, supra note 46, at 1495.
273. Cf. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 34, at 50–51 (advancing a similar argument).
274. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
275. E.g., United States v. Old Dominion Boat Club, 630 F.3d 1039, 1041 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
276. E.g., United States v. Seale, 577 F.3d 566 (5th Cir. 2009).

888

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 38

only have them because inquiry into the past would otherwise be a
normal part of our legal reasoning.
Viewing historical inquiry as just one component of ordinary
legal practice also helps answer the criticism that originalism,
and particularly original-law originalism, is just too difficult to
carry out.277 Finding out the standard interpretive methods in a
legal system at a certain time isn’t any harder, in the abstract,
than comprehending a term of art in a contemporary trade;278
both require knowledge of conventions that are broadly held
and at the same time potentially contested. (Indeed, translators
of historical documents do this work all the time.) We read texts
for their obvious signification, and if someone wants to argue
that we’re doing it wrong, we wait for them to do so persuasively. In the meantime, we do what seems right on the evidence we have.
And in any case, this might just be what our law requires.
Understanding originalism as a legal project, rather than a
primarily historical one, doesn’t let us avoid the historical research by focusing on lawyers’ questions. Rather, it shows why
the historical issues are lawyers’ questions. We try all the time
to answer questions of the form, “what was the law on topic X
as of date Y?” That’s precisely what originalism does, for good
or ill. And it’s also precisely what we do, albeit with a broader
universe of legal materials, when we answer questions of the
form, “what is the law on topic X today?”—questions that lawyers ought to be able to answer, if anyone can.
CONCLUSION
Originalism as adherence to the Founders’ law is complicated and simple at the same time. It’s extremely complicated, because we have to know the content of the Founders’ law in its
full glory—interpretive rules, context, rules of change, and so
on. But it’s also very simple, because it makes the basis for
originalism very easy to understand: our law stays the same
until it’s lawfully changed. That ought to be the originalist’s
slogan, because originalism is a theory of legal change.

277. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 262.
278. E.g., Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116,
117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“The issue is, what is chicken?”).

